2011年12月16日 星期五

國際刑事法院人事新局 非洲戰犯會減少嗎?

國際刑事法院人事新局 非洲戰犯會減少嗎?

嚴震生  100/12/15



       今年十一月底,來自甘比亞的國際刑事法院(International Criminal Court,ICC)女性副首席檢察官班索達(Fatou Bensouda),才與阿根廷籍首席檢察官歐坎波(Luis Moreno Ocampo)抵達的黎波里(Tripoli)與利比亞的國家過渡委員會(National Transitional Council)討論強人格達費(Muammar Gaddafi)之子在 ICC 受審的可能性。三週之後,羅馬規約(Rome Statute)締約國大會(Assembly of State Parties)已經無異議通過她的任命,明年將由班索達接替任滿的歐坎波,成為 ICC 史上第二位首席檢察官。


        國際刑事法院是根據羅馬規約(Rome Statute of the International Court)成立於二○○二年,歐坎波在次年就出任首席檢察官,九年任期即將結束。他行事大膽,作風高調,時常引發國際爭議,也招致許多批評。外界對歐坎波最大的批判是 ICC 設立以來所有起訴或是通緝的對象皆來自非洲國家,其中烏干達、剛果和中非共和國是由此三國本身提出,蘇丹和利比亞則是有聯合國安理會的授權,肯亞和象牙海岸是歐坎波主動展開調查後起訴者。


        剛果的盧班加(Thomas Lubanga)是ICC第一個起訴的戰爭罪犯,他是剛果內戰(一九九八─二○○三)中一支叛軍的領導人,罪名是「大規模族群屠殺、謀殺、酷刑、強暴、殘害、及強徵兒童兵」(ethnic massacres, murder, torture, rape and mutilation, as well as the recruitment of child soldiers);中非共和國的起訴對象則是二○○二─二○○三年間對平民犯下強暴等性犯罪(sexual crime)的鄰國剛果另一支叛軍領導人班巴(Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo);烏干達的叛軍─上帝抵抗軍(Lord’s Resistance Army,LRA)領導人孔尼(Joseph Kony)和其幾位黨羽則是因違反人類罪行(crime against humanity)及強行徵召兒童兵等三十三項罪名遭到歐坎波的通緝。


        這三個案子都是由這些國家的政府提出者,前兩者多少是政府藉由外力來懲治叛軍,盧班加是先遭 ICC 通緝、再被政府逮捕,則是因其在中非共和國犯下的罪行遭 ICC 通緝,再被比利時政府逮捕移交。後者同樣是由烏干達政府提出,但即使美國在今年十月派了百人的作戰部隊協助捉拿孔尼,但截自目前為止,仍無法將其緝捕送審。


        二○○八年歐坎波對因在達佛地區犯下種族滅絕(genocide)及戰爭罪行(war crime)的蘇丹總統巴席爾(Omar al Bashir),發出逮捕令(arrest warrant),巴席爾也曾為首位受此屈辱的在任總統。儘管歐坎波的獨斷行動遭到質疑,但至少他還獲得北約(NATO)及國際特赦組織(Amnesty International)等的支持,聯合國安理會的一五九三號決議亦要求蘇丹政府與ICC合作。巴席爾當然不會將自己交給ICC,阿拉伯聯盟(Arabic League)和非洲聯盟(African Union)都拒絕接受歐坎波的主張,因此當巴席爾到卡達和埃及訪問時,地主國並未將其逮捕,交給ICC。繼巴席爾後,ICC在二月獲得聯合國安理會的授權調查,於六月對另一位在任領導人─利比亞強人格達費(Muammar Gaddafi)發出通緝令,但因他在今年十月已死在戰場,因此未來的起訴對象將是他的兒子和其他政府官員。


        以上五個案例或是由衝突受害國家本身提出要求,或是獲得聯合國安理會授權,還能為非洲國家所接受,但肯亞和象牙海岸的通緝則是來自於歐坎波的「勇於任事」。肯亞二○○七─二○○八年的總統大選引發爭議,導致族群衝突及殘殺無辜,造成一千五百人死亡。沒有來自肯亞政府的要求、亦缺乏聯合國安理會的授權,但歐坎波還是在去年底提出六個嫌犯的名單,包括肯亞國父肯亞塔(Jomo Kenyatta)之子、現任副總理暨財政部長的烏胡魯‧肯亞塔(Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta),此六位遭起訴者統稱「歐坎波六人組」(The Ocampo Six)。在他們接受審判後,判決結果最遲將於明年初公佈。


        ICC 在十月展開對象牙海岸去年底至今年四月因選舉結果爭議引發內戰中的各項刑事責任,去年選舉落敗但拒絕下台的前總統巴博(Laurent Gbagbo)在內戰中失利後,原先已被軟禁,但歐坎波決定以違反人類罪行等四項罪名將其起訴,並於十一月底逮捕巴博送往海牙受審。


        由於這七個案例都是非洲的政府領導人或叛軍領袖,讓非洲國家質疑 ICC 的公理是否僅針對非洲而來。非洲聯盟委員會主席讓平(Jean Ping)直接表示:「非洲大陸不反對ICC的正義,但我們反對歐坎波的(正義)。」,並舉例許多違反國際人道的事件並不發生在非洲,但ICC從未起訴像緬甸等國家的官員與元首。過去九年ICC讓非洲在國際的形象受到嚴重損害。未來幾年,ICC還有象牙海岸、蘇丹、利比亞、烏干達、與肯亞的重要案件要處理,新一任ICC的首席檢察官身分對國際人道法在非洲的接受程度,勢必有深遠影響。


        非洲聯盟在今年十二月國際刑事法院締約國大會前就公開支持來自非洲的首席檢察官候選人。雖然非洲本次在候選人名單中還有坦尚尼亞的法務部長,但班索達擁有盧安達國際刑事法庭(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,ICTR)服務的經驗,從二○○四年至今起更於ICC擔任歐坎波的副手,也更受到各個羅馬規約締約國的支持。在新任首席檢察長人選的競逐中,能夠擊敗五十一位競爭對手,獲得一百一十九個成員國的共識與支持,為實至名歸。南非媒體 Daily Maverick 甚至稱她為:「能在非洲拯救 ICC 的女性」。


        另一個重點是班索達在甘比亞的國內政治背景,她是甘比亞第一位國際海洋法的專家。在進入ICC和ICTR以前,更在商業銀行擔任總經理,資歷豐富。一九九八年,她擔任過一九九四年經軍事政變奪權成功的甘比亞總統賈梅(Yahya Jammeh)民選政府的法務部長,直到兩千年被賈梅開除。

賈梅在位的十七年間,不斷鎮壓與騷擾反對勢力和媒體。未來班索達在 ICC 擔任首席檢察官時,是否會回頭懲處賈梅的罪行?或者一旦賈梅遭起訴,時任政府職位的班索達也會有連帶責任?明年一月歐坎波正式卸任後,這些都相當值得觀察。


【2011-12-15 聯合新聞網】


全文網址: 國際刑事法院人事新局 非洲戰犯會減少嗎? - 嚴震生專欄 - 全球觀點 - udn全球觀察 http://mag.udn.com/mag/world/storypage.jsp?f_MAIN_ID=364&f_SUB_ID=3489&f_ART_ID=360794#ixzz1ghVUC3aR
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張貼:昱誠TA



2011年10月22日 星期六

國家政策委員會關於「和平協議」的文章

國家政策委員會關於「和平協議」的文章

因為無法直接轉載,故放上連結給大家看看:

http://ns1.npf.org.tw/tag?query=%E5%92%8C%E5%B9%B3%E5%8D%94%E8%AD%B0



張貼者:昱誠 TA

張五岳:馬總統的「和平協議」有前提性但無時間表



[台灣商報] 20111019

張五岳 (淡江大學中國大陸研究所所長 台灣競爭力論壇兩岸經貿互動組召集人)


馬總統17日在副總統蕭萬長、行政院長吳敦義,及相關部會首長陪同下,於總統府召開「黃金十年,國家願景」最後一場記者會,宣布「和平兩岸」、「友善國際」願景。由於過去三年多以來,在馬政府各項施政滿意度調查中,兩岸關係議題始終高居民調支持度的第一位。因此,各界無不高度關注一個要追求連任的總統,如何在既有基礎上,進一步提出兩岸關係的和平發展願景,打造台灣的黃金十年,以爭取選民的認可與支持。


在馬總統所提的「和平兩岸」、「友善國際」的願景,外界最關注的莫過於馬總統提出,「未來10年當中,應該去對於兩岸在循序漸進的情況下,能夠審慎的來斟酌在10年當中,是不是去洽簽兩岸和平協議」。外界紛紛猜測馬總統何以提出此一議題?對於此一重要與敏感的議題總統作何表述?



其實馬總統提出此一議題並不讓人感到意外,因為:首先,既然馬總統所提的「未來十年」與「黃金十年」而不是連任後的「當務之急」與「未來四年」,因此對於兩岸的和平協議議題完全不觸及實在難以讓人想像,更何況他在2008年520的就職演說中就曾經提出「未來我們也將與大陸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商」,一個自許非常重承諾的總統自然對此曾經宣示過的議題難以迴避。其次,對於此一重要但並非迫切的敏感議題,馬總統也提出了三個重要的前提與基礎,那就是第一,國內民意有高度的支持,第二,國家有確實的需要,第三,必須要在國會監督的情況下,才會踏出這一步,眾所皆知,短期內要達成這三個前提要件機會可謂微乎其微。



再則,筆者認為馬總統提出對此一議題也凸顯出,對於兩岸和平協議的商談有其階段性,但並無具體時間表。所謂的階段性除了要滿足上述三個馬總統所提出的前提要件外,總統也明確提出這並非當務之急,馬總統一再強調「政府推動兩岸關係一向有一個重要原則,就是循序漸進,也就是『先急後緩、先易後難、先經後政』」,和平協議的議題並非『急』迫的議題,也非容『易』的議題,更非『經』濟的議題,而是政治的議題,因此,此一議題能否開展,既要取決兩岸的良性動,更繫乎台灣內部對於此一議題的共識。 雖然台海的政治和平穩定,攸關到兩岸經貿發展與社會的交流。但未來兩岸要簽署和平協議必然要有效處理:一是涉及相互定位的政治歧見,二是避免戰爭衝突的軍事互信,三是涉及敏感的兩岸國際空間互動。上述三個問題在當前兩岸的政治互動與台灣內部朝野互動,均非短期內就可以有效解決。因此,馬總統提出此一重要願景,會加上這麼多的主客觀條件,自然不會讓人感到意外。




出處: http://news.sina.com.tw/article/20111020/4756369.html

張貼者:昱誠 TA

和平協議 台灣要掌發球權(甘逸驊)





馬總統日前宣示未來兩岸簽訂「和平協議」的可能性,為兩岸關係的前景,提出具前瞻性的規劃。
事實上,早在二○○三年民進黨執政時期,陳水扁前總統即提出「和平穩定互動架構協議」的構想,主張在過渡時期的對話架構當中,雙方應該簽訂和平協議,民進黨政府並於二○○四年公布「軍事互信機制」的詳盡規劃。二○○五年連胡會談提出包含和平協議與軍事互信機制的五項願景,從此開啟了兩岸關係朝向正面發展的契機。


環視全球各地區的相關案例,和平協議看似只是一張白紙黑字的文件,但和平協議攤在世人面前,接受國際社會的檢驗,無論是否具有國內法性質的法律約束力,都因為受國際社會矚目而使得和平協議獲得「合法化」的基礎,因而形成相當程度國際道德的制約作用。


回顧過去三年多兩岸互動過程中,我方掌握了三大條件,使台灣權益獲得充分保障。第一,我方具有兩岸關係進程的主導權,兩岸協商的議題與進度得以完全操之在我;第二,雖然兩岸規模與實力有相當差距,但我方極力爭取台灣利益,絕非大陸刻意「讓利」,而是我方站穩立場毫不退讓;第三,我方堅守「以台灣為主、對人民有利」的原則,以確保國家與人民的利益。


除了持續堅守這些條件,未來兩岸和平協議的推動應可發揮以下的功能:第一,經由兩岸在政治議題的協商,確認兩岸互動的平等地位;第二,將兩岸既有成就予以「制度化」,不因雙方各自的政治情況或國際因素的變化而遭到破壞,並進一步確保台海現狀的維持;第三,將兩岸關係的和平發展呈現在國際社會前,如此得以提高既有成就的國際合法性地位;第四,兩岸關係的正常發展得以擴大未來台灣影響大陸社會發展的空間。


台灣應持續站穩兩岸關係的主導地位,主動提出有利於台灣人民與台海安定的兩岸議題,掌握兩岸互動節奏。在獲得廣大台灣民意的前提下,和平協議的提出與可行性的探尋,將有助於促成兩岸和平的不可逆轉性,以獲致兩岸永續和平。

【2011/10/19 聯合報】http://udn.com/    A15版


出處: http://udn.com/NEWS/OPINION/X1/6660879.shtml

張貼者: 昱誠 TA

規劃和平條約 而非和平協議(姜皇池)

蘋果日報  

總統提出在(1)國家需要,(2)人民支持與(3)國會監督三條件下,將於未來十年內與中國簽署「和平協議」。追求和平,國人之所願,吾人亦感贊同,但此時此際,如此條件與安排,仍令人有所疑慮。


就個人專業所知,國際實踐中,用以處理和平問題的法律文件,至少包括:「和平條約」(peace treaty)、「停戰協定」(armistice)、「停火協定」(ceasefire agreement or truce)與「和平協議」(peace accords)等等。 
前三者是具國際法拘束力條約,且是屬於國家與國家間所簽署的國際文件;而後者(「和平協議」)則是旨在中止「一國」合法政府與叛亂團體、或是一國之內數個政治實體間的武裝衝突,簽署以避免生靈塗炭;換言之,「和平協議」屬於政府與叛亂團體締結之「聲明」(statements),不僅不屬1969年維也納《條約法公約》所規範,且用以確認系爭衝突為一國國內紛爭,交戰各方之領土同屬單一國家。 
置於台灣個案事實考量,則發現:(一)台海間並無實際武裝衝突,遑論停止武裝衝突迫切性;(二)台海狀態是中國內戰與冷戰等複雜國內與國際因素所造成,若是簽署單純所謂「和平協議」,則是將台灣與中國間目前或未來之衝突,定性為中國內戰之延續,純屬中國「內部事務」(domestic jurisdiction),國際組織或第三國介入之法律障礙將因此提高,亦將使美國對台灣軍售喪失國際合法性與正當性;(三)「中華民國政府」面對在中國內戰中獲勝之「中華人民共和國政府」,特別「中華人民共和國政府」已是方今舉世所承認之中國唯一合法政府,若簽署「和平協議」,又無力讓「中華民國政府」成為中國唯一合法政府,如此在國際法定位上,將使「中華民國政府」成為「中國武裝叛亂團體」。 


使台灣問題中國化


人類史上往往充滿令人錯愕之情事,中國道士們為求長生而煉丹,因而發明火藥,最後成為殺人利器;歐洲傳教士堅信「信基督,得永生」,為呼喚眾人前來禮拜,希望教堂的鐘聲,可傳播更遠,教堂的鐘,可更經久耐撞,研究改良,終於煉出「精鋼」鑄鐘,結果不僅用以鑄鐘,更轉而用以模鑄大砲鋼管,使大砲殺傷力,更加增進。本來都是一番好意,卻得到傷心慘目的結果。
吾人相信總統是一番好意,因此希望政府應好好規劃簽署中國與台灣間之「和平條約」或「停戰協定」,否則呼應2005年《連胡會公報》的「促進終止敵對狀態,達成『和平協議』」,執意簽署所謂「和平協議」,將使台灣問題中國化,實際上落實中國《反分裂國家法》第七條所期待的「和平統一協議」,隔絕其他國際社會成員介入之合法性,將台灣人民身家性命繫於中國「佛心佛性」,恐需再細細思量。 


作者為台灣大學法律系教授、英國倫敦大學瑪莉皇后學院國際法博士 
出處:  http://tw.nextmedia.com/applenews/article/art_id/33753064/IssueID/20111020

張貼者:昱誠  TA

2011年9月24日 星期六

Why the U.N. cannot create Palestine

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/23/opinion/makovsky-un-palestinian-state/index.html?hpt=hp_t2


Editor's note: David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he directs the Project on the Middle East Peace Process. He is also an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

(CNN) -- The U.N. speeches of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are behind us. There are doubts that Abbas will even be able to secure the necessary nine of 15 votes in the U.N. Security Council to support a resolution on statehood, regardless of the expected U.S. veto.

But the resolution raises another question. If the United Nations created Israel in the past, why shouldn't it create the state of Palestine today?

This argument bears a certain allure, but does not apply in today's context. A dignified two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis can only be reached by an agreement between the two sides to end their tragic conflict.

The United Nations created the state of Israel in 1947 because Britain sought an exit from the region. Its resources and energies depleted by World War II, London was no longer interested in shouldering its post- World War I responsibilities as the mandate power to administer the territory. Britain had committed itself in 1917 to a "national Jewish home" in what became known as the Balfour Declaration, which it then used its internationally backed mandate to effect. But Britain soon tired of being caught in the middle of conflicting Jewish and Arab nationalism.

David Makovsky
David Makovsky

In 1947, Britain sought the assistance of the newly founded United Nations to make its exit from this part of the Middle East. Today, however, Israelis and Palestinians cannot do the same. In a two-state solution, they will be living together in a very narrow swath of territory -- the two states will measure merely 50 miles wide from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.

Yet, if there is an overriding lesson from the 1947 U.N. vote, it is that the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

It was the pragmatism of the Jewish advocates -- known as Zionists -- that enabled their success. In 1947, the U.N. called for a two-state solution that would divide the land between the Jews and the Arabs. Neither side would be fully satisfied by this arrangement, but it at least addressed some of their concerns.

Despite the resolution's call for internationalizing Jerusalem, mainstream Zionists accepted what became known as the Partition Plan. Although domestic critics attacked this camp, led by David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, for its moderation, members evinced considerable political courage and were not deterred. In contrast, the Arab camp viewed the Partition Plan as unjust in its call to share the territory, as they believed that the Zionists had no right to the land whatsoever.

The Zionists accepted half the loaf, and despite Arabs attacking it on the day of its birth, Israel flourished. Because the Arabs refused its half of the loaf, Palestine was never born.

The Palestinians missed a similar opportunity for statehood in 2000, when Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat rejected what became known as the Clinton Parameters, and again in 2008, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered President Abbas a deal that was even more generous. To this day, Abbas has never explained why he refused Olmert's offer, raising the question of whether the Palestinians will ever accept any deal.

It is for this reason that Israelis often quote their legendary statesman Abba Eban, declaring that "the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. "

Today, it is the Netanyahu government that is being flogged with the Eban dictum, but the only Palestinian alternative to Abbas is the radical Hamas.

Netanyahu finds this choice unfair, because he believes he has consistently begged Abbas to return to negotiations, yet Abbas has only agreed to do so for two weeks in the past two and a half years. Netanyahu suspects a direct correlation between 1947, 2000, 2008, and today: that Palestinians are avoiding peace as a favorable track to statehood.

Meanwhile, given his suspicion of Netanyahu's intentions, Abbas fears that any resumption of negotiations would inevitably meander, damaging his popularity among the Palestinian people. This is one of the reasons why he is appealing to the United Nations.

One proposal to put talks back on track, under discussion behind the scenes, is that negotiations be guided by President Obama's key Middle East speeches in May, seeking to solve borders with land exchanges, as well as security arrangements and mutual recognition, which would lend structure and direction to the process. There are signs that Netanyahu and Abbas are seriously considering this option. Netanyahu hinted to it in Friday's speech, and this seems to be the direction of the long-awaited statement from the Quartet for MIddle East Peace -- calling for intensified talks -- released on Friday afternoon.

The circumstances surrounding the Palestinian bid at the U.N. are very different from those surrounding the British appeal in 1947. Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are seeking to exit the region. The United Nations drama is misplaced: Peace needs to be made in the Middle East, not the Northeast. The suspicions and historical claims of both sides can only be resolved between them, as they will be the ones who must live with the results.

The leaders of both sides should look to 1947 for a lesson on the importance of political pragmatism, rather than an all-or-nothing approach. As President Obama said this week at the U.N., there are no shortcuts to peace.
i
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David Makovsky.

巴勒斯坦遞出入聯申請


圖/聯合報提供

巴勒斯坦自治政府主席阿巴斯(左)23日正式遞交入聯申請給聯合國秘書長潘基文。
(美聯社)
不顧美國和以色列強烈反對,巴勒斯坦自治政府主席阿巴斯23日向聯合國安理會申請成為聯合國正式會員國,希望藉著在世界舞台上的外交大動作,為巴勒斯坦獨立建國注入活水。阿巴斯的高級幕僚說,除了向聯合國提出入聯申請外,阿巴斯還交給聯合國秘書長潘基文一封信函,請他立刻將巴勒斯坦入聯申請提交安理會,並把尋求承認國家地位的提案提交聯合國大會。
阿巴斯提出入聯申請後,隨即在聯合國大會發表演說。隨後演說的以色列總理內唐亞胡予以譴責。以色列和美國反對巴勒斯坦申請入聯,認為巴勒斯坦建國的唯一途徑,是與以色列達成和平協定。
在約旦河西岸,幾個城市架起巨大電視螢幕,巴勒斯坦人懷著既驕傲又擔憂的心情,等候阿巴斯發表演說。42歲的史塔耶說:「我們早該這麼做了,卻總是受到國際壓力。我很驕傲,希望不要再拖延。」
巴勒斯坦的入聯申請以1967年「六日戰爭」前的邊界為國界,包含約旦河西岸、東耶路撒冷和加薩走廊。
但阿巴斯的外交動作無法改變現實,以色列仍占領西岸和東耶路撒冷,並嚴格控制通往加薩的通道。
分析家說,申請入聯讓巴勒斯坦獨立回到國際舞台,有助於重啟一年前破裂的以巴和談。阿巴斯想藉此爭取國際同情,讓以色列更難以抗拒以1967年之前邊界為談判基礎。
阿巴斯若能獲得一些具體成果,例如聯合國大會承認巴勒斯坦的國家地位,他就達到鞏固國內政治地位的目的。

圖/聯合報提供
【2011/09/24 聯合報】 @ http://udn.com/

2011年5月30日 星期一

怕索賠 日考慮加盟核災公約

【中央社╱東京29日專電】


2011.05.29 01:28 pm



日本「朝日新聞」報導,因日本未加盟國際原子能總署核災事故公約,東京電力福島第一核電廠輻射外洩事故,很可能背負外國巨額索賠的包袱,日本政府正考慮加盟。



報導指出,國際原子能總署(IAEA)通過3項有關原子能損害補償公約(CSC),明訂在核災發生國進行損害賠償官司的相關事項。



美國一直邀日本加盟CSC,但日本認為不會發生事故,且如果受波及,日本的受害者就得在他國打官司,所以未答應加盟。



福島第一核電廠事故輻射污水流到大海,造成他國漁業受損,被海嘯沖走大量遭輻射污染的殘留物漂流到他國,若有受害者提起訴訟,將在原告國進行審判。賠償金的計算將依據審判國的標準,賠償金恐膨脹。



日本的民事訴訟法規承認他國的判決,日本企業在美國的損害賠償官司遭巨額索賠的案例增加中。



菅直人政府支援東京電力公司的賠償,但如果在海外訴訟的案子增多,僅日本國內就需付出數兆日圓的賠償,負擔有可能增大。



國際私法專家表示,事故發生後,如在被提起告訴之前加盟公約,經過與對方國交涉,司法審判管轄權有可能留在日本。



日本首相官邸(行政中心)有人認為,今後日本也可能發生餘震,使得災情擴大,因此在被提告之前,應早日加盟核災補償公約。



報導引述管理賠償制度的文部科學省研究開發局長藤木完治表示,經過這次福島核電廠事故,將更認真考慮是否加盟。



但要加盟的話,需要修改國內法,核災事故發生後才加盟的話,也可能引起其他加盟國的反彈。



到目前為止,尚未有核災適用國際條約的案例。日前法國八大工業國高峰會的領袖宣言盼IAEA能加強功能,國際上要求核電廠安全管理、補償核災事故受害的趨勢加強。



1954年美國試爆氫彈導致日本遠洋鮪魚船「第五福龍丸」船員受到輻射污染事件是採政治解決的方式,由美國政府支付巨額慰問金。1986年前蘇聯發生車諾比(Chernobyl)核災事故後,並未賠償遭到輻射污染的西方國家酪農。



【2011/05/29 中央社】 @ http://udn.com/

2011年5月28日 星期六

國際法庭重釋神廟判決 泰捍衛

 
柬埔寨要求國際法庭重新解釋1962年對普里維希神廟(Preah Vihear)的判決。此案30日將在荷蘭海牙開庭,泰國外交部長卡席特(Kasit Piromya)將率領法律團隊前往捍衛立場。
泰柬今年兩度在邊界發生交火衝突,柬埔寨向國際法庭上訴,要求法庭解釋當年把神廟判給柬埔寨的判決,並解釋當時沒有進一步說明的周圍爭議地區。
普里維希神廟周圍4.6公里土地歸屬問題,一直爭議不斷,泰柬都宣稱擁有該爭議土地,並且多次兵戎相向。
柬埔寨除了要求法庭重新解釋外,也請求法庭發布臨時命令,要求泰國立即從爭議地區撤兵,並禁止泰國軍隊靠近神廟,且要求泰國停止各項影響柬埔寨權益、或讓爭議複雜化的各項活動。
泰國外交部發言人塔尼(Thani Thongphakdi)今天表示,卡席特30日、31日將出席法院聽證會,泰方預期法庭會在1到3星期內針對柬埔寨臨時命令的訴求,做出裁決。
另外,泰國看守總理艾比希(Abhisit Vejjajiva)指出,柬埔寨要求管理神廟周圍地區的計畫,聯合國教育、科學、文化組織(UNESCO)可能會延後審議。
艾比希也表示,泰柬邊界委員會預計近期內在柬埔寨開會,兩國將透過雙邊機制,針對爭議領土與交火衝突等問題,展開會談。
【2011/05/27 中央社】 http://udn.com/

2011年2月27日 星期日

UN罕見!格達費移送ICC

法新社紐約聯合國總部26日電) 聯合國(UN)安全理事會今天緊急開會,通過決議對利比亞獨夫格達費(Moamer Kadhafi)制裁,以懲罰他下令血腥鎮壓示威民眾。
  西方國家的制裁提案包括武器禁運,並針對格達費、格達費家屬及親信實施凍結資產及限制出境等措施。但提案中關於利比亞血腥鎮壓事件是否違反人道法,以及是否送交國際刑事法庭(ICC)調查,因爭議頗高,必須動用表決。
  中國、俄羅斯南非印度、巴西和葡萄牙的外交官員,對於是否要讓國際刑事法庭審理格達費,表達各項關切。
  但是聯合國秘書長潘基文(Ban Ki-moon)對安理會15個會員國施壓,強調若不及時採取「具體行動」,將會傷及更多人命。
  利比亞駐聯合國大使沙格翰(AbdurrahmanShalgam)則寫了一封懇切的陳情信,希望安理會採取行動,制止格達費的「暴行」。沙格翰是格達費童年摯友,曾任利比亞外交部長。
  沙格翰今天在信中,強烈支持安理會決議文草案,也支持將鎮壓百姓一案送交ICC調查。外交官員原先以為,格達費送交ICC審議的決議,要等到下週才舉行。
  匿名安理會外交官表示:「我們有多層面的顧慮,但是ICC是最大癥結。」
  法國和英國是決議文草案的主導國,法國駐聯合國大使阿勞德(Gerard Araud)說:「在武器禁運和制裁方面,各國意見相同,檯面上唯一分歧議題是把格達費送交ICC審理。」
  英國駐聯合國大使葛蘭特(Mark Lyall Grant)也說,利比亞鎮壓是否觸犯人道罪,引發多項爭論。
  制裁決議文若被視為不正當干預一國內政,或恐對未來國際行動設下先例,向來不為中國及俄羅斯所接受。
  安理會主要會員國當中,美國、中國、俄羅斯和印度都不是ICC會員國,且對ICC抱持懷疑態度。
  達佛(Darfur)大屠殺案是安理會唯一送交ICC審理的爭議。蘇丹總統巴席爾(Omar al-Bashir)後來以戰爭罪和種族屠殺罪遭起訴。
  然而,格達費死忠分子在的黎波里(Tripoli)對示威人士開槍的報導,再加上25日安理會上的幾個慷慨陳詞,讓安理會最後不得不努力通過決議文。
  聯合國秘書長潘基文表示,利比亞血腥鎮壓已造成逾千人死亡。利比亞駐聯合國公使先前說,數千人已經喪命。
  潘基文表示,利比亞武裝部隊到各個醫院殺害受傷的異議人士,拒絕開槍的士兵則會遭到格殺。
  他說:「該是安理會考慮採取具體行動的時候了。」
  隨後利比亞駐聯合國大使沙格翰也把格達費形容成德國的希特勒(Adolf Hitler)、柬埔寨的波布(PolPot)和蘇聯的史達林(Joseph Stalin),並籲請安理會採取行動制止格達費的「暴行」。
  沙格翰說,格達費現在對人民的態度是,「你若不讓我統治,我就殺了你、毀了你」。
  他懇切地告訴安理會成員:「求求你,聯合國,救救利比亞。讓那裡不再血流成河,不要再濫殺無辜。」他說:「我們需要你們做出果斷、快速和勇敢的決議。」
  安理會今天於罕見地在週末晚間召開緊急會議,15個安理會會員國無異議通過決議案,制裁格達費及其家屬親信。(譯者:中央社賴秀如)1

2011年2月25日 星期五

Lessons Learned from the Philippines Extradition Row

http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17&id=20110208000086




這是有關領域管轄和引渡問題的傳統國際法議題,許老師本週六在台大校總區的霖澤館(法學院)有一場座談,同學可以去聽聽看喲!


The jurisdiction dispute that arose after the Philippines deported 14 Taiwanese nationals suspected of fraud to China for crimes against Chinese nationals indicates Taiwan's challenges in maintaining ties with Southeast Asian countries, despite improved cross-strait relations.



Taiwan's relations, especially in trade with Southeast Asia, regressed after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2000 due to increased tensions with China.



As Taiwan's relations with China have a great influence on the island's trade with Southeast Asia, which improved after the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement was signed in 2010, Taiwan cannot afford to see relations worsen as its economic strength could again be undermined.



Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should be held responsible for its slow reaction to the current dispute since it did not have first-hand information about the arrests involving the Taiwanese nationals last December.



While Taiwan has to protest against the Philippines bowing down to China's demands to hand over the Taiwanese suspects, the MOFA should work on building closer ties with Southeastern Asian countries, particularly in trade, education and culture, even though Taiwan and China have ceased the fight for diplomatic allies.



Chinese pressure to extradite the Taiwanese suspects is understandable, since Taiwan had ruled in a similar previous case that the defendants were innocent, which meant the Chinese victims are unable to seek compensation. Fraud is a felony that carries a sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment in China, while the maximum jail term for the same crime is five years in Taiwan.



However, since Taiwan and China have different human rights standards, the location of the trial has a significant impact on the rights of the accused Taiwanese nationals.



Taiwan should make it clear to China that the island is toughening its stand against crime with heavier sentences in order to prevent similar disputes in the future, especially since both sides signed a judicial cooperation agreement in 2009.



Taiwan should also be credited for its restrained official reaction to the matter, focusing only on the return of the Taiwanese suspects. It would increase trust between the two sides if China hands back the Taiwanese nationals to stand trial in Taiwan after it completes its own investigation.

(issued by TA wei-en)

Warning: old stone temples can start wars

甫里維哈寺位於泰國與柬埔寨之間邊界山脈中一塊高地(Dangrek)上,根據1904年暹羅(泰國舊稱)和法國(當時柬埔寨是法國的保護地)之間的一項條約規定,雙方同意有關此山脈邊界線之劃定,應沿著分水嶺線為之。兩國為此另設立了一個混合委員會,礙於技術因素,當時泰國政府委託由法國調查隊來負責繪製該地區地圖的工作。1908年地圖繪製完成,當時泰國政府收到此地圖時即已發現古寺被標註在柬埔寨的領域內(即山脈分水嶺的另一邊),但卻未表明任何異議(直到1935年)。1953年柬埔寨獨立之後,新政府試圖在該地區確立其領土主權,但因泰國派駐軍隊於古寺,效果有限。1959年10月,柬埔寨向國際法院提起訴訟,請求法院宣告古寺的領土主權屬於柬埔寨,泰國應將其駐紮於古寺的武裝部隊撤離。法院先於1961年確立對本案的管轄權,接著在1962年對本案進行實質審理與裁決,判定古寺是屬於柬埔寨。(issued by TA wei-en)






Thai-Cambodian conflictFeb 10th 2011
KANTHARALAK



SITTING on her straw mat, Pisamai Poonsuk recalls how her family of ten fled their border village in a pickup truck soon after the shells began falling. After staying the night with relatives, the family moved into a temporary camp. Ms Pisamai, a cassava farmer, is waiting for the all-clear to go home. She prays the ceasefire will hold between the Thai and Cambodian soldiers ranged along a disputed border. She has little time for Thai jingoism. “We should trade with the Cambodians. We should be brothers.”



Fat chance. The clashes that erupted on February 4th were the fiercest since July 2008, when the two armies first began rumbling at each other in the vicinity of Preah Vihear, an 11th-century Khmer temple that Cambodia wants to develop for mass tourism. Six people died and dozens more were injured during four days of fighting. The temple itself was only slightly damaged. Each side accuses the other of firing first into populated areas.


Though the shelling has stopped, any ceasefire remains fragile as long as nationalists in both countries keep stoking the dispute. Thailand’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, faces street protests by the ultra-conservative People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) over his alleged failure to defend Thai soil. Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, does not tolerate protests but is sensitive to claims of lost sovereignty. He quickly castigated war-mongering Thailand and called for UN peacekeepers on the border.



It is not the first time that an ancient temple has bred violence. In 2003 anti-Thai riots erupted in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was misquoted as saying that Angkor Wat, which appears on the Cambodian flag, belonged to Thailand. On February 8th PAD leaders said that Thai troops should threaten to invade, forcing a return of Preah Vihear. To Cambodians, resentful of being pushed around by big neighbours, this is bully-boy stuff.



In 1962 the World Court ruled that Preah Vihear, which sits on a ridge, was on Cambodian soil. But it did not rule on overlapping claims to the temple’s hinterland. In 2008 UNESCO listed the temple as a World Heritage site, to the delight of Cambodia’s tourist industry. The PAD cried foul over what it claimed was a loss of Thai territory. The controversy became a pretext for marathon protests that helped topple an elected government and sweep Mr Abhisit into power. Now the PAD vows to topple its erstwhile ally.



Despite international concern, Mr Hun Sen’s plea for UN intervention seems a non-starter. Thailand insists that bilateral talks can resolve the border dispute and rejects outside mediation. This did not stop Indonesia from dipping a toe into the row. It currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which the two feuding parties belong (see Banyan). Its foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, flew to both capitals this week for talks. But, an ASEAN diplomat sniffs, Indonesia should keep its own ambitions in check, lest the tables are turned in future. Nobody wants anyone “meddling in his own affairs”, he says. So much for Ms Pisamai’s brotherhood.

A sea of disputes

這是有關國家間爭端領土的問題,剛好與老師下週開始要談的國家領域有關。台灣也是這起爭端中的一造,值得大家關注。(issued by TA wei-en)




Feb 21st 2011, 8:44 by Banyan

TWO truths about the disputes in the South China Sea are well-recognised: they are extremely complex, and much misunderstood. An illuminating day-long conference at the Institute of South-East Asian Studies in Singapore on February 18th brought home a third. There is no realistic prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped is to manage the disputes without any resort to armed conflict.



Part of the difficulty is that the dispute has so many aspects—or rather there are so many separate disputes. The territorial issue that receives so much attention is itself a plethora of different and overlapping claims. China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel island chain, from which China evicted Vietnam in 1974, in the dying days of the Vietnam war. Taiwan—because it is the “Republic of China”—mirrors China’s claim, so that huge unresolved dispute also has a bearing on this one. The same three parties also claim the Spratly archipelago, to the south. But in the south, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also have partial claims.





Some of these arguments might in theory be soluble under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established in 1982. Some of the parties have tried to align their claim with UNCLOS. In 2009, for example, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission, showing where they thought their claims lay, based on their continental shelves. This implied that the Spratlys—a collection of reefs, rocks and tiny islands—were all too small to support human habitation and hence have their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under UNCLOS.



China, however, objected to that submission and tabled its own map, with nine dotted lines outlining its claim. Joined up, the dotted lines give it not just the two chains, but almost the whole sea. There seems to be no basis for this in UNCLOS. But China points to history. It says the map has been in use since the Republic of China published it in 1946, and, until quite recently, nobody minded. Indonesia, in turn, subsequently objected to China’s objection, which gave China a claim over some Indonesian waters, too. According to American officials, China has upped the ante by talking of its territorial claims in the South China Sea as a “core” national interest, on a par with Tibet and Taiwan.



There is a huge amount at stake. Besides fisheries, the sea, particularly around the Spratlys, is believed to be enormously rich in hydrocarbons. The lure of such riches ought to make it attractive to devise joint-development mechanisms so that all could benefit. In practice, the resources potentially available make it even harder for any country to moderate its claim.



The sea is also a vital shipping route, accounting for a big chunk of world trade. It is the importance of the freedom of navigation and of overflight that has given America its pretext for louder involvement. This was initially welcomed by the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations when voiced at a regional forum in Hanoi in July last year, So fiercely did China object to America’s rather disingenuous offer of “mediation”, however, that some countries may now be ruing it.



So a second related dispute is between two regional superpowers: China and America. In particular, America and China differ over whether military activities are permissible in another country's EEZ. America insists they are. China objects to them and has on occasion harassed America’s spy planes and survey ships.



A third dispute is between China and ASEAN. These two reached a common “Declaration on Conduct” (DoC) in 2002 in an attempt to minimise the risk of conflict. But efforts to turn it into a formal and binding code have got nowhere, partly because of China’s anger at ASEAN’s attempts to develop a common approach.



China argues that ASEAN has no role in territorial issues, and insists on negotiating with the other claimants bilaterally. ASEAN sees this as an effort to pick off its members one by one. It argues that its own charter forces members to consult, as they do before each working group on the code of conduct (the next one is due in March).



Optimists point out that, distant though any settlement seems to be, at least the DoC has helped keep tensions down. Indeed, since 1988, when China and Vietnam clashed near the Spratlys, there have been no serious armed flare-ups. Tension rose in 1995, when China was found to have built on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines. Fishermen are sometimes locked up for encroaching in another country’s claim. But the risk of escalation into conflict has seemed limited.



It is even possible to claim that the “self-restraint” the DoC calls for is being observed, since no new uninhabited islands or rocks have been occupied. However, that may be because none of those that is left is remotely big enough, and on those that were already occupied, building has continued, in some cases as if the claimants hope to turn rocks, or even “low-tide elevations”, into real islands—a practice not recognised under UNCLOS.



In their complexity, the South China Sea disputes provide material for endless scholarly bickering. Now that America has made it a focus for its re-engagement in Asia’s seas as a superpower and guarantor of the peace, and China has made clear it resents this, they also present some serious risks.