2011年10月22日 星期六
張五岳：馬總統的「和平協議」有前提性但無時間表
[台灣商報] 20111019
張五岳 (淡江大學中國大陸研究所所長 台灣競爭力論壇兩岸經貿互動組召集人)
馬總統17日在副總統蕭萬長、行政院長吳敦義，及相關部會首長陪同下，於總統府召開「黃金十年，國家願景」最後一場記者會，宣布「和平兩岸」、「友善國際」願景。由於過去三年多以來，在馬政府各項施政滿意度調查中，兩岸關係議題始終高居民調支持度的第一位。因此，各界無不高度關注一個要追求連任的總統，如何在既有基礎上，進一步提出兩岸關係的和平發展願景，打造台灣的黃金十年，以爭取選民的認可與支持。
在馬總統所提的「和平兩岸」、「友善國際」的願景，外界最關注的莫過於馬總統提出，「未來10年當中，應該去對於兩岸在循序漸進的情況下，能夠審慎的來斟酌在10年當中，是不是去洽簽兩岸和平協議」。外界紛紛猜測馬總統何以提出此一議題?對於此一重要與敏感的議題總統作何表述?
其實馬總統提出此一議題並不讓人感到意外，因為:首先，既然馬總統所提的「未來十年」與「黃金十年」而不是連任後的「當務之急」與「未來四年」，因此對於兩岸的和平協議議題完全不觸及實在難以讓人想像，更何況他在2008年520的就職演說中就曾經提出「未來我們也將與大陸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商」，一個自許非常重承諾的總統自然對此曾經宣示過的議題難以迴避。其次，對於此一重要但並非迫切的敏感議題，馬總統也提出了三個重要的前提與基礎，那就是第一，國內民意有高度的支持，第二，國家有確實的需要，第三，必須要在國會監督的情況下，才會踏出這一步，眾所皆知，短期內要達成這三個前提要件機會可謂微乎其微。
再則，筆者認為馬總統提出對此一議題也凸顯出，對於兩岸和平協議的商談有其階段性，但並無具體時間表。所謂的階段性除了要滿足上述三個馬總統所提出的前提要件外，總統也明確提出這並非當務之急，馬總統一再強調「政府推動兩岸關係一向有一個重要原則，就是循序漸進，也就是『先急後緩、先易後難、先經後政』」，和平協議的議題並非『急』迫的議題，也非容『易』的議題，更非『經』濟的議題，而是政治的議題，因此，此一議題能否開展，既要取決兩岸的良性動，更繫乎台灣內部對於此一議題的共識。 雖然台海的政治和平穩定，攸關到兩岸經貿發展與社會的交流。但未來兩岸要簽署和平協議必然要有效處理:一是涉及相互定位的政治歧見，二是避免戰爭衝突的軍事互信，三是涉及敏感的兩岸國際空間互動。上述三個問題在當前兩岸的政治互動與台灣內部朝野互動，均非短期內就可以有效解決。因此，馬總統提出此一重要願景，會加上這麼多的主客觀條件，自然不會讓人感到意外。
出處： http://news.sina.com.tw/article/20111020/4756369.html
張貼者：昱誠 TA
和平協議 台灣要掌發球權（甘逸驊）
2011.10.19 02:57 am |
馬總統日前宣示未來兩岸簽訂「和平協議」的可能性，為兩岸關係的前景，提出具前瞻性的規劃。
事實上，早在二○○三年民進黨執政時期，陳水扁前總統即提出「和平穩定互動架構協議」的構想，主張在過渡時期的對話架構當中，雙方應該簽訂和平協議，民進黨政府並於二○○四年公布「軍事互信機制」的詳盡規劃。二○○五年連胡會談提出包含和平協議與軍事互信機制的五項願景，從此開啟了兩岸關係朝向正面發展的契機。
環視全球各地區的相關案例，和平協議看似只是一張白紙黑字的文件，但和平協議攤在世人面前，接受國際社會的檢驗，無論是否具有國內法性質的法律約束力，都因為受國際社會矚目而使得和平協議獲得「合法化」的基礎，因而形成相當程度國際道德的制約作用。
回顧過去三年多兩岸互動過程中，我方掌握了三大條件，使台灣權益獲得充分保障。第一，我方具有兩岸關係進程的主導權，兩岸協商的議題與進度得以完全操之在我；第二，雖然兩岸規模與實力有相當差距，但我方極力爭取台灣利益，絕非大陸刻意「讓利」，而是我方站穩立場毫不退讓；第三，我方堅守「以台灣為主、對人民有利」的原則，以確保國家與人民的利益。
除了持續堅守這些條件，未來兩岸和平協議的推動應可發揮以下的功能：第一，經由兩岸在政治議題的協商，確認兩岸互動的平等地位；第二，將兩岸既有成就予以「制度化」，不因雙方各自的政治情況或國際因素的變化而遭到破壞，並進一步確保台海現狀的維持；第三，將兩岸關係的和平發展呈現在國際社會前，如此得以提高既有成就的國際合法性地位；第四，兩岸關係的正常發展得以擴大未來台灣影響大陸社會發展的空間。
台灣應持續站穩兩岸關係的主導地位，主動提出有利於台灣人民與台海安定的兩岸議題，掌握兩岸互動節奏。在獲得廣大台灣民意的前提下，和平協議的提出與可行性的探尋，將有助於促成兩岸和平的不可逆轉性，以獲致兩岸永續和平。
【2011/10/19 聯合報】
出處： http://udn.com/NEWS/OPINION/X1/6660879.shtml
規劃和平條約 而非和平協議（姜皇池）
蘋果日報
總統提出在（1）國家需要，（2）人民支持與（3）國會監督三條件下，將於未來十年內與中國簽署「和平協議」。追求和平，國人之所願，吾人亦感贊同，但此時此際，如此條件與安排，仍令人有所疑慮。
就個人專業所知，國際實踐中，用以處理和平問題的法律文件，至少包括：「和平條約」（peace treaty）、「停戰協定」（armistice）、「停火協定」（ceasefire agreement or truce）與「和平協議」（peace accords）等等。
前三者是具國際法拘束力條約，且是屬於國家與國家間所簽署的國際文件；而後者（「和平協議」）則是旨在中止「一國」合法政府與叛亂團體、或是一國之內數個政治實體間的武裝衝突，簽署以避免生靈塗炭；換言之，「和平協議」屬於政府與叛亂團體締結之「聲明」（statements），不僅不屬1969年維也納《條約法公約》所規範，且用以確認系爭衝突為一國國內紛爭，交戰各方之領土同屬單一國家。
置於台灣個案事實考量，則發現：（一）台海間並無實際武裝衝突，遑論停止武裝衝突迫切性；（二）台海狀態是中國內戰與冷戰等複雜國內與國際因素所造成，若是簽署單純所謂「和平協議」，則是將台灣與中國間目前或未來之衝突，定性為中國內戰之延續，純屬中國「內部事務」（domestic jurisdiction），國際組織或第三國介入之法律障礙將因此提高，亦將使美國對台灣軍售喪失國際合法性與正當性；（三）「中華民國政府」面對在中國內戰中獲勝之「中華人民共和國政府」，特別「中華人民共和國政府」已是方今舉世所承認之中國唯一合法政府，若簽署「和平協議」，又無力讓「中華民國政府」成為中國唯一合法政府，如此在國際法定位上，將使「中華民國政府」成為「中國武裝叛亂團體」。
使台灣問題中國化
人類史上往往充滿令人錯愕之情事，中國道士們為求長生而煉丹，因而發明火藥，最後成為殺人利器；歐洲傳教士堅信「信基督，得永生」，為呼喚眾人前來禮拜，希望教堂的鐘聲，可傳播更遠，教堂的鐘，可更經久耐撞，研究改良，終於煉出「精鋼」鑄鐘，結果不僅用以鑄鐘，更轉而用以模鑄大砲鋼管，使大砲殺傷力，更加增進。本來都是一番好意，卻得到傷心慘目的結果。
吾人相信總統是一番好意，因此希望政府應好好規劃簽署中國與台灣間之「和平條約」或「停戰協定」，否則呼應2005年《連胡會公報》的「促進終止敵對狀態，達成『和平協議』」，執意簽署所謂「和平協議」，將使台灣問題中國化，實際上落實中國《反分裂國家法》第七條所期待的「和平統一協議」，隔絕其他國際社會成員介入之合法性，將台灣人民身家性命繫於中國「佛心佛性」，恐需再細細思量。
作者為台灣大學法律系教授、英國倫敦大學瑪莉皇后學院國際法博士
張貼者：昱誠 TA
2011年9月24日 星期六
Why the U.N. cannot create Palestine
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/23/opinion/makovsky-un-palestinian-state/index.html?hpt=hp_t2
(CNN) -- The U.N. speeches of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are behind us. There are doubts that Abbas will even be able to secure the necessary nine of 15 votes in the U.N. Security Council to support a resolution on statehood, regardless of the expected U.S. veto.
But the resolution raises another question. If the United Nations created Israel in the past, why shouldn't it create the state of Palestine today?
This argument bears a certain allure, but does not apply in today's context. A dignified two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis can only be reached by an agreement between the two sides to end their tragic conflict.
The United Nations created the state of Israel in 1947 because Britain sought an exit from the region. Its resources and energies depleted by World War II, London was no longer interested in shouldering its post- World War I responsibilities as the mandate power to administer the territory. Britain had committed itself in 1917 to a "national Jewish home" in what became known as the Balfour Declaration, which it then used its internationally backed mandate to effect. But Britain soon tired of being caught in the middle of conflicting Jewish and Arab nationalism.
In 1947, Britain sought the assistance of the newly founded United Nations to make its exit from this part of the Middle East. Today, however, Israelis and Palestinians cannot do the same. In a two-state solution, they will be living together in a very narrow swath of territory -- the two states will measure merely 50 miles wide from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
Yet, if there is an overriding lesson from the 1947 U.N. vote, it is that the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.
It was the pragmatism of the Jewish advocates -- known as Zionists -- that enabled their success. In 1947, the U.N. called for a two-state solution that would divide the land between the Jews and the Arabs. Neither side would be fully satisfied by this arrangement, but it at least addressed some of their concerns.
Despite the resolution's call for internationalizing Jerusalem, mainstream Zionists accepted what became known as the Partition Plan. Although domestic critics attacked this camp, led by David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, for its moderation, members evinced considerable political courage and were not deterred. In contrast, the Arab camp viewed the Partition Plan as unjust in its call to share the territory, as they believed that the Zionists had no right to the land whatsoever.
The Zionists accepted half the loaf, and despite Arabs attacking it on the day of its birth, Israel flourished. Because the Arabs refused its half of the loaf, Palestine was never born.
The Palestinians missed a similar opportunity for statehood in 2000, when Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat rejected what became known as the Clinton Parameters, and again in 2008, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered President Abbas a deal that was even more generous. To this day, Abbas has never explained why he refused Olmert's offer, raising the question of whether the Palestinians will ever accept any deal.
It is for this reason that Israelis often quote their legendary statesman Abba Eban, declaring that "the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. "
Today, it is the Netanyahu government that is being flogged with the Eban dictum, but the only Palestinian alternative to Abbas is the radical Hamas.
Netanyahu finds this choice unfair, because he believes he has consistently begged Abbas to return to negotiations, yet Abbas has only agreed to do so for two weeks in the past two and a half years. Netanyahu suspects a direct correlation between 1947, 2000, 2008, and today: that Palestinians are avoiding peace as a favorable track to statehood.
Meanwhile, given his suspicion of Netanyahu's intentions, Abbas fears that any resumption of negotiations would inevitably meander, damaging his popularity among the Palestinian people. This is one of the reasons why he is appealing to the United Nations.
One proposal to put talks back on track, under discussion behind the scenes, is that negotiations be guided by President Obama's key Middle East speeches in May, seeking to solve borders with land exchanges, as well as security arrangements and mutual recognition, which would lend structure and direction to the process. There are signs that Netanyahu and Abbas are seriously considering this option. Netanyahu hinted to it in Friday's speech, and this seems to be the direction of the long-awaited statement from the Quartet for MIddle East Peace -- calling for intensified talks -- released on Friday afternoon.
The circumstances surrounding the Palestinian bid at the U.N. are very different from those surrounding the British appeal in 1947. Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are seeking to exit the region. The United Nations drama is misplaced: Peace needs to be made in the Middle East, not the Northeast. The suspicions and historical claims of both sides can only be resolved between them, as they will be the ones who must live with the results.
The leaders of both sides should look to 1947 for a lesson on the importance of political pragmatism, rather than an all-or-nothing approach. As President Obama said this week at the U.N., there are no shortcuts to peace.
i
Editor's note: David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he directs the Project on the Middle East Peace Process. He is also an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
(CNN) -- The U.N. speeches of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are behind us. There are doubts that Abbas will even be able to secure the necessary nine of 15 votes in the U.N. Security Council to support a resolution on statehood, regardless of the expected U.S. veto.
But the resolution raises another question. If the United Nations created Israel in the past, why shouldn't it create the state of Palestine today?
This argument bears a certain allure, but does not apply in today's context. A dignified two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis can only be reached by an agreement between the two sides to end their tragic conflict.
The United Nations created the state of Israel in 1947 because Britain sought an exit from the region. Its resources and energies depleted by World War II, London was no longer interested in shouldering its post- World War I responsibilities as the mandate power to administer the territory. Britain had committed itself in 1917 to a "national Jewish home" in what became known as the Balfour Declaration, which it then used its internationally backed mandate to effect. But Britain soon tired of being caught in the middle of conflicting Jewish and Arab nationalism.
David Makovsky
In 1947, Britain sought the assistance of the newly founded United Nations to make its exit from this part of the Middle East. Today, however, Israelis and Palestinians cannot do the same. In a two-state solution, they will be living together in a very narrow swath of territory -- the two states will measure merely 50 miles wide from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
Yet, if there is an overriding lesson from the 1947 U.N. vote, it is that the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.
It was the pragmatism of the Jewish advocates -- known as Zionists -- that enabled their success. In 1947, the U.N. called for a two-state solution that would divide the land between the Jews and the Arabs. Neither side would be fully satisfied by this arrangement, but it at least addressed some of their concerns.
Despite the resolution's call for internationalizing Jerusalem, mainstream Zionists accepted what became known as the Partition Plan. Although domestic critics attacked this camp, led by David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann, for its moderation, members evinced considerable political courage and were not deterred. In contrast, the Arab camp viewed the Partition Plan as unjust in its call to share the territory, as they believed that the Zionists had no right to the land whatsoever.
The Zionists accepted half the loaf, and despite Arabs attacking it on the day of its birth, Israel flourished. Because the Arabs refused its half of the loaf, Palestine was never born.
The Palestinians missed a similar opportunity for statehood in 2000, when Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat rejected what became known as the Clinton Parameters, and again in 2008, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered President Abbas a deal that was even more generous. To this day, Abbas has never explained why he refused Olmert's offer, raising the question of whether the Palestinians will ever accept any deal.
It is for this reason that Israelis often quote their legendary statesman Abba Eban, declaring that "the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. "
Today, it is the Netanyahu government that is being flogged with the Eban dictum, but the only Palestinian alternative to Abbas is the radical Hamas.
Netanyahu finds this choice unfair, because he believes he has consistently begged Abbas to return to negotiations, yet Abbas has only agreed to do so for two weeks in the past two and a half years. Netanyahu suspects a direct correlation between 1947, 2000, 2008, and today: that Palestinians are avoiding peace as a favorable track to statehood.
Meanwhile, given his suspicion of Netanyahu's intentions, Abbas fears that any resumption of negotiations would inevitably meander, damaging his popularity among the Palestinian people. This is one of the reasons why he is appealing to the United Nations.
One proposal to put talks back on track, under discussion behind the scenes, is that negotiations be guided by President Obama's key Middle East speeches in May, seeking to solve borders with land exchanges, as well as security arrangements and mutual recognition, which would lend structure and direction to the process. There are signs that Netanyahu and Abbas are seriously considering this option. Netanyahu hinted to it in Friday's speech, and this seems to be the direction of the long-awaited statement from the Quartet for MIddle East Peace -- calling for intensified talks -- released on Friday afternoon.
The circumstances surrounding the Palestinian bid at the U.N. are very different from those surrounding the British appeal in 1947. Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are seeking to exit the region. The United Nations drama is misplaced: Peace needs to be made in the Middle East, not the Northeast. The suspicions and historical claims of both sides can only be resolved between them, as they will be the ones who must live with the results.
The leaders of both sides should look to 1947 for a lesson on the importance of political pragmatism, rather than an all-or-nothing approach. As President Obama said this week at the U.N., there are no shortcuts to peace.
i
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David Makovsky.
巴勒斯坦遞出入聯申請
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阿巴斯提出入聯申請後，隨即在聯合國大會發表演說。隨後演說的以色列總理內唐亞胡予以譴責。以色列和美國反對巴勒斯坦申請入聯，認為巴勒斯坦建國的唯一途徑，是與以色列達成和平協定。 在約旦河西岸，幾個城市架起巨大電視螢幕，巴勒斯坦人懷著既驕傲又擔憂的心情，等候阿巴斯發表演說。42歲的史塔耶說：「我們早該這麼做了，卻總是受到國際壓力。我很驕傲，希望不要再拖延。」 巴勒斯坦的入聯申請以1967年「六日戰爭」前的邊界為國界，包含約旦河西岸、東耶路撒冷和加薩走廊。 但阿巴斯的外交動作無法改變現實，以色列仍占領西岸和東耶路撒冷，並嚴格控制通往加薩的通道。 分析家說，申請入聯讓巴勒斯坦獨立回到國際舞台，有助於重啟一年前破裂的以巴和談。阿巴斯想藉此爭取國際同情，讓以色列更難以抗拒以1967年之前邊界為談判基礎。 阿巴斯若能獲得一些具體成果，例如聯合國大會承認巴勒斯坦的國家地位，他就達到鞏固國內政治地位的目的。
【2011/09/24 聯合報】  |
2011年5月30日 星期一
怕索賠 日考慮加盟核災公約
【中央社╱東京29日專電】
2011.05.29 01:28 pm
日本「朝日新聞」報導，因日本未加盟國際原子能總署核災事故公約，東京電力福島第一核電廠輻射外洩事故，很可能背負外國巨額索賠的包袱，日本政府正考慮加盟。
報導指出，國際原子能總署（IAEA）通過3項有關原子能損害補償公約（CSC），明訂在核災發生國進行損害賠償官司的相關事項。
美國一直邀日本加盟CSC，但日本認為不會發生事故，且如果受波及，日本的受害者就得在他國打官司，所以未答應加盟。
福島第一核電廠事故輻射污水流到大海，造成他國漁業受損，被海嘯沖走大量遭輻射污染的殘留物漂流到他國，若有受害者提起訴訟，將在原告國進行審判。賠償金的計算將依據審判國的標準，賠償金恐膨脹。
日本的民事訴訟法規承認他國的判決，日本企業在美國的損害賠償官司遭巨額索賠的案例增加中。
菅直人政府支援東京電力公司的賠償，但如果在海外訴訟的案子增多，僅日本國內就需付出數兆日圓的賠償，負擔有可能增大。
國際私法專家表示，事故發生後，如在被提起告訴之前加盟公約，經過與對方國交涉，司法審判管轄權有可能留在日本。
日本首相官邸（行政中心）有人認為，今後日本也可能發生餘震，使得災情擴大，因此在被提告之前，應早日加盟核災補償公約。
報導引述管理賠償制度的文部科學省研究開發局長藤木完治表示，經過這次福島核電廠事故，將更認真考慮是否加盟。
但要加盟的話，需要修改國內法，核災事故發生後才加盟的話，也可能引起其他加盟國的反彈。
到目前為止，尚未有核災適用國際條約的案例。日前法國八大工業國高峰會的領袖宣言盼IAEA能加強功能，國際上要求核電廠安全管理、補償核災事故受害的趨勢加強。
1954年美國試爆氫彈導致日本遠洋鮪魚船「第五福龍丸」船員受到輻射污染事件是採政治解決的方式，由美國政府支付巨額慰問金。1986年前蘇聯發生車諾比（Chernobyl）核災事故後，並未賠償遭到輻射污染的西方國家酪農。
【2011/05/29 中央社】 @ http://udn.com/
2011.05.29 01:28 pm
日本「朝日新聞」報導，因日本未加盟國際原子能總署核災事故公約，東京電力福島第一核電廠輻射外洩事故，很可能背負外國巨額索賠的包袱，日本政府正考慮加盟。
報導指出，國際原子能總署（IAEA）通過3項有關原子能損害補償公約（CSC），明訂在核災發生國進行損害賠償官司的相關事項。
美國一直邀日本加盟CSC，但日本認為不會發生事故，且如果受波及，日本的受害者就得在他國打官司，所以未答應加盟。
福島第一核電廠事故輻射污水流到大海，造成他國漁業受損，被海嘯沖走大量遭輻射污染的殘留物漂流到他國，若有受害者提起訴訟，將在原告國進行審判。賠償金的計算將依據審判國的標準，賠償金恐膨脹。
日本的民事訴訟法規承認他國的判決，日本企業在美國的損害賠償官司遭巨額索賠的案例增加中。
菅直人政府支援東京電力公司的賠償，但如果在海外訴訟的案子增多，僅日本國內就需付出數兆日圓的賠償，負擔有可能增大。
國際私法專家表示，事故發生後，如在被提起告訴之前加盟公約，經過與對方國交涉，司法審判管轄權有可能留在日本。
日本首相官邸（行政中心）有人認為，今後日本也可能發生餘震，使得災情擴大，因此在被提告之前，應早日加盟核災補償公約。
報導引述管理賠償制度的文部科學省研究開發局長藤木完治表示，經過這次福島核電廠事故，將更認真考慮是否加盟。
但要加盟的話，需要修改國內法，核災事故發生後才加盟的話，也可能引起其他加盟國的反彈。
到目前為止，尚未有核災適用國際條約的案例。日前法國八大工業國高峰會的領袖宣言盼IAEA能加強功能，國際上要求核電廠安全管理、補償核災事故受害的趨勢加強。
1954年美國試爆氫彈導致日本遠洋鮪魚船「第五福龍丸」船員受到輻射污染事件是採政治解決的方式，由美國政府支付巨額慰問金。1986年前蘇聯發生車諾比（Chernobyl）核災事故後，並未賠償遭到輻射污染的西方國家酪農。
【2011/05/29 中央社】 @ http://udn.com/
2011年5月28日 星期六
國際法庭重釋神廟判決 泰捍衛
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柬埔寨要求國際法庭重新解釋1962年對普里維希神廟（Preah Vihear）的判決。此案30日將在荷蘭海牙開庭，泰國外交部長卡席特（Kasit Piromya）將率領法律團隊前往捍衛立場。 泰柬今年兩度在邊界發生交火衝突，柬埔寨向國際法庭上訴，要求法庭解釋當年把神廟判給柬埔寨的判決，並解釋當時沒有進一步說明的周圍爭議地區。 普里維希神廟周圍4.6公里土地歸屬問題，一直爭議不斷，泰柬都宣稱擁有該爭議土地，並且多次兵戎相向。 柬埔寨除了要求法庭重新解釋外，也請求法庭發布臨時命令，要求泰國立即從爭議地區撤兵，並禁止泰國軍隊靠近神廟，且要求泰國停止各項影響柬埔寨權益、或讓爭議複雜化的各項活動。 泰國外交部發言人塔尼（Thani Thongphakdi）今天表示，卡席特30日、31日將出席法院聽證會，泰方預期法庭會在1到3星期內針對柬埔寨臨時命令的訴求，做出裁決。 另外，泰國看守總理艾比希（Abhisit Vejjajiva）指出，柬埔寨要求管理神廟周圍地區的計畫，聯合國教育、科學、文化組織（UNESCO）可能會延後審議。 艾比希也表示，泰柬邊界委員會預計近期內在柬埔寨開會，兩國將透過雙邊機制，針對爭議領土與交火衝突等問題，展開會談。 【2011/05/27 中央社】 |
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