請同學思考以下紅色字之主張：國際公海中的資產其實是「誰先佔到誰就擁有開採權」。
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【聯合晚報╱國際新聞組/綜合報導】
2010.08.29 02:30 pm
外媒批：暗搶水下主權
中央社29日報導，中國在南海深處插國旗，引起外國媒體質疑，甚至稱這是中國「祕密搶佔水下主權」。中國專家否認這項批評，表示這次行動旨在尋找公海資源。
中國科技部和國家海洋局26日在北京宣佈，中國第一台自行研製「蛟龍號」深海載人潛水器潛航成功，最大下潛深度達3759公尺，並將一面五星旗插在375公尺深的南海海底。
中：美國沒搶到才指責
中國著名軍事評論家宋曉軍接受北京「環球網」採訪時表示，中國這次行動其實是為了尋找公海資源，而美國等媒體主要也是因為自己「沒搶著」，才對中國橫加指責。
宋曉軍表示，國際公海中的資產其實是「誰先佔到誰就擁有開採權」，中國這次就是「家長為孩子找食」的行為，是為「80後」（1980年後出生）、「90後」開發尋找新資源礦產的行為。
中：各國都有找公海資源
宋曉軍指出，美國、日本、法國、俄羅斯等其實都有尋找公海資源的行為，只不過近年來，美國因國外戰事消耗而放緩，而中國投資跟進比較大，發展也比較快而已。
【2010/08/29 聯合晚報】 @ http://udn.com/
2010年8月29日 星期日
2010年8月24日 星期二
友達案 台盼美法院先解限境
【中央社╱台北23日電】 2010.08.23 11:06 pm
友達光電3名主管遭美國法院留置。經濟部將依法務部建議，去函美方說明友達對台灣產業貢獻，以及當事人日後必定配合美方調查、出庭，先爭取美國法院解除限制出境。
友達光電股份有限公司主管遭美國法院留置，經濟部將再去函友達美國辯護律師事務所轉呈承審法院，說明友達在台灣產業的貢獻、涉案主管對公司營運重要性及兩國司法互助機制。
友達在美國遭控與同業協議面板價格，涉及反托辣斯法，集團內包括威力盟電子股份有限公司、隆達電子股份有限公司董事長陳炫彬、友達總經理陳來助及佳世達科技股份有限公司總經理熊暉日前前往美國參與審前開庭，卻遭美國法院強制要求3人在審理前留在當地。
行政院長吳敦義指示副院長陳沖召集相關部會研議如何有效協助3人早日解除留置返國，日後再隨時赴美應訊。
吳敦義表示，國人在外國、公海、海洋受到扣留等，政府當盡全力協助，確保國人生命、財產安全。以往漁民在海外遭他國政府扣押或干擾時，政府都運用相關資源及透過管道全力營救，讓漁民早日安然回國，因此他指示陳沖召集相關部會研議友達案。
行政院晚間表示，全案在美已進入司法程序，雖然中華民國尊重美國司法部門處置，但全案攸關台灣企業海外涉訟案件，政府將提供友達在官司上的必要協助，包括美國反托辣斯法相關資訊（包括行政院公平交易委員會7月9日有關研討會的研究資料）。
法務部政務次長陳守煌表示，由於3人是遭美國法院限制出境，但在當地的人身自由並未被拘束，法務部是建議經濟部與友達，先出具各種證明給美國法院，說明3人及友達在台灣產業的貢獻，3人必須返台處理相關業務與家庭，日後必定會配合美方調查，赴美應訊，盼美方先解除限制出境。
經濟部將根據跨部會會議的意見，彙整相關資料，透過友達在美國當地的律師轉交美國法院，以利相關人員出庭時先爭取法官解除限制出境；友達相關人員出庭時，經濟部也指派駐美代表處人員到庭旁聽，了解案情動態並提供業者相關協助。
工業局長杜紫軍今晚表示，將由他代表政府書寫信函，「政府出面多少會有幫助」。
政府信函中將強調，台美有司法互助協議，讓友達3名高層返台，不可能會發生友達高層隱匿在台灣，不願意出庭的狀況。
【2010/08/23 中央社】 @ http://udn.com/
友達光電3名主管遭美國法院留置。經濟部將依法務部建議，去函美方說明友達對台灣產業貢獻，以及當事人日後必定配合美方調查、出庭，先爭取美國法院解除限制出境。
友達光電股份有限公司主管遭美國法院留置，經濟部將再去函友達美國辯護律師事務所轉呈承審法院，說明友達在台灣產業的貢獻、涉案主管對公司營運重要性及兩國司法互助機制。
友達在美國遭控與同業協議面板價格，涉及反托辣斯法，集團內包括威力盟電子股份有限公司、隆達電子股份有限公司董事長陳炫彬、友達總經理陳來助及佳世達科技股份有限公司總經理熊暉日前前往美國參與審前開庭，卻遭美國法院強制要求3人在審理前留在當地。
行政院長吳敦義指示副院長陳沖召集相關部會研議如何有效協助3人早日解除留置返國，日後再隨時赴美應訊。
吳敦義表示，國人在外國、公海、海洋受到扣留等，政府當盡全力協助，確保國人生命、財產安全。以往漁民在海外遭他國政府扣押或干擾時，政府都運用相關資源及透過管道全力營救，讓漁民早日安然回國，因此他指示陳沖召集相關部會研議友達案。
行政院晚間表示，全案在美已進入司法程序，雖然中華民國尊重美國司法部門處置，但全案攸關台灣企業海外涉訟案件，政府將提供友達在官司上的必要協助，包括美國反托辣斯法相關資訊（包括行政院公平交易委員會7月9日有關研討會的研究資料）。
法務部政務次長陳守煌表示，由於3人是遭美國法院限制出境，但在當地的人身自由並未被拘束，法務部是建議經濟部與友達，先出具各種證明給美國法院，說明3人及友達在台灣產業的貢獻，3人必須返台處理相關業務與家庭，日後必定會配合美方調查，赴美應訊，盼美方先解除限制出境。
經濟部將根據跨部會會議的意見，彙整相關資料，透過友達在美國當地的律師轉交美國法院，以利相關人員出庭時先爭取法官解除限制出境；友達相關人員出庭時，經濟部也指派駐美代表處人員到庭旁聽，了解案情動態並提供業者相關協助。
工業局長杜紫軍今晚表示，將由他代表政府書寫信函，「政府出面多少會有幫助」。
政府信函中將強調，台美有司法互助協議，讓友達3名高層返台，不可能會發生友達高層隱匿在台灣，不願意出庭的狀況。
【2010/08/23 中央社】 @ http://udn.com/
2010年8月21日 星期六
2010年8月20日 星期五
ECFA近期生效
http://news.cts.com.tw/cnyes/money/201008/201008190544020.html
立法院昨日完成ECFA(兩岸經濟合作架構協議)及其附件審議，立法院已函覆行政院，行政院預定明天發文陸委會，海基會最快本周末就可通知大陸海協會，近日內即可生效。
陸委會副主委劉德勳表示，按照ECFA協議第15條規定，各自完成相關程序後書面通知對方，我方在立法院部分已經完成，等立法院完成正式結論給行政院後，才會發文陸委會。
至於相關配套部分，政院高層表示，立法院會知請總統公布，總統須在10日內公告，公告後3天正式生效，不過法律配套部分和ECFA文本生效會脫鉤處理。
由於ECFA生效後，兩岸經合會將隨之啟動，劉德勳表示，經合會將涵蓋政府相關機制，重點仍就會擺在經濟部，投資保障部分包含投審會、投資處等單位。
劉德勳也提到，由於投資保障協議預定在年底第6次江陳會簽署，所以投資保障小組已經啟動運作，未來不會回到經合會平台，投資保障小組協商後，再透過海基、海協兩會做最後確認。
至於兩岸經合會將會依照協議實質運作的機制運作，劉德勳說，ECFA生效會，兩岸經合會先成立委員會，雙方溝通後再成立小組，依循過去協商模式，先有個別研究、共同研究、協商後，才會成立小組，也就是委員會成立後，再依照需求成立小組。
由於ECFA及IPR(兩岸智慧財產權保護合作協議)已在第2次臨時會審議通過，行政院長吳敦義特別行政院院會中，對立法院長王金平的大力支持及朝野委員的理性問政表示感謝。
吳揆表示，ECFA的簽署及完成法定程序可說是兩岸經貿關係一個重要的里程碑，對台灣、中國大陸，甚至是整個亞太地區、全世界，都有非常重大的意義。藉由ECFA走出經濟邊緣化的陰影，建立了兩岸經貿合作制度化的架構，更向亞太區域經濟整合邁出了一大步，奠定台灣未來黃金十年的根基。
吳敦義指出，目前正是各國重新評價台灣在亞太經貿版圖的關鍵時刻，也是全民檢驗簽署兩岸經濟協議成果的開始，任何協議不可能只有好處，沒有任何衝擊，相關部會一定要加強對可能受衝擊的產業、廠商及勞工的輔導與救濟措施。
同時，政府將積極推動與主要貿易夥伴洽簽FTA或其他的經濟合作、投資保障等協定，並全面動員向主要國家招商。他還提到，ECFA生效後6個月內，就要陸續展開投資保障、爭端解決、貨品貿易、服務貿易等4項後續協議的協商，陸委會、經濟部、財政部及金管會等相關部會應做好妥善的準備。(記者：劉曉霞)
立法院昨日完成ECFA(兩岸經濟合作架構協議)及其附件審議，立法院已函覆行政院，行政院預定明天發文陸委會，海基會最快本周末就可通知大陸海協會，近日內即可生效。
陸委會副主委劉德勳表示，按照ECFA協議第15條規定，各自完成相關程序後書面通知對方，我方在立法院部分已經完成，等立法院完成正式結論給行政院後，才會發文陸委會。
至於相關配套部分，政院高層表示，立法院會知請總統公布，總統須在10日內公告，公告後3天正式生效，不過法律配套部分和ECFA文本生效會脫鉤處理。
由於ECFA生效後，兩岸經合會將隨之啟動，劉德勳表示，經合會將涵蓋政府相關機制，重點仍就會擺在經濟部，投資保障部分包含投審會、投資處等單位。
劉德勳也提到，由於投資保障協議預定在年底第6次江陳會簽署，所以投資保障小組已經啟動運作，未來不會回到經合會平台，投資保障小組協商後，再透過海基、海協兩會做最後確認。
至於兩岸經合會將會依照協議實質運作的機制運作，劉德勳說，ECFA生效會，兩岸經合會先成立委員會，雙方溝通後再成立小組，依循過去協商模式，先有個別研究、共同研究、協商後，才會成立小組，也就是委員會成立後，再依照需求成立小組。
由於ECFA及IPR(兩岸智慧財產權保護合作協議)已在第2次臨時會審議通過，行政院長吳敦義特別行政院院會中，對立法院長王金平的大力支持及朝野委員的理性問政表示感謝。
吳揆表示，ECFA的簽署及完成法定程序可說是兩岸經貿關係一個重要的里程碑，對台灣、中國大陸，甚至是整個亞太地區、全世界，都有非常重大的意義。藉由ECFA走出經濟邊緣化的陰影，建立了兩岸經貿合作制度化的架構，更向亞太區域經濟整合邁出了一大步，奠定台灣未來黃金十年的根基。
吳敦義指出，目前正是各國重新評價台灣在亞太經貿版圖的關鍵時刻，也是全民檢驗簽署兩岸經濟協議成果的開始，任何協議不可能只有好處，沒有任何衝擊，相關部會一定要加強對可能受衝擊的產業、廠商及勞工的輔導與救濟措施。
同時，政府將積極推動與主要貿易夥伴洽簽FTA或其他的經濟合作、投資保障等協定，並全面動員向主要國家招商。他還提到，ECFA生效後6個月內，就要陸續展開投資保障、爭端解決、貨品貿易、服務貿易等4項後續協議的協商，陸委會、經濟部、財政部及金管會等相關部會應做好妥善的準備。(記者：劉曉霞)
2010年8月5日 星期四
台星共推經濟合作協議
中央社 2010/8/5
http://www.cna.com.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=FirstNews&ID=201008050001
（中央社記者唐佩君、李佳霏新加坡-台北5日電）駐新加坡代表處及新加坡駐台北代表處今天發表聯合新聞稿，雙方同意在WTO架構下，探討經濟合作協議可行性。這是繼ECFA後，台灣參與區域經貿整合重要一步。
在聯合新聞稿中，台灣將以在世界貿易組織（WTO）下的全名「台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖個別關稅領域（簡稱中華台北）」與新加坡推動經濟合作協議的簽署，該名稱是2002年民進黨執政時，台灣加入WTO所採用的名稱，這也是當時朝野獲得共識的名稱。
外交人士指出，WTO明文規定其會員享有與該組織其他會員簽署符合WTO規範貿易協定權利，台灣與新加坡同為WTO成員，採用台灣在WTO的名稱、在WTO架構下與其他會員簽署相關經濟合作協議，是參與區域經濟整合最務實的作法。
對未來簽署協議的名稱，外交人士指出，在WTO架構下的區域貿易協定（Regional Trade Agreement）是依據1994關稅暨貿易總協定（GATT 1994）第24條有關自由貿易區（Free Trade Area）及服務貿易總協定（GATS）第5條有關經濟整合的規範簽署，其中並未規定使用「Free Trade Agreement」，所以未來也不會拘泥於此名稱。
外交人士進一步指出，在實務上，星國與其他國家簽署相關協定，也使用其他名稱，如新加坡紐西蘭「緊密經濟夥伴」（closer economic partnership）、新加坡印度「全面經濟合作協定」（Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement）、新加坡日本「經濟夥伴協定」（Economic Partnership Agreement）等。
黨政高層表示，總統馬英九上任後，極力為台灣打造有利的經濟環境，提升台灣的競爭力。簽署ECFA後為求參與經濟整合與推動全球布局，馬總統多次宣示，要推動與其他主要貿易夥伴洽簽經濟合作協議，此次台星發表聯合新聞稿，即將展開簽署經濟合作協議的具體行動，證明馬總統說到做到。
外交人士表示，台灣與新加坡經濟互補大、競爭性小，台星經濟協議對雙方均有利，對台灣農業也無衝擊。台星簽署協議後，對台灣與其他國家洽簽相關經濟合作協議也有正面作用。而藉星國本身為東協會員及已簽署新加坡印度「全面經濟合作協定」的優勢，未來台星簽署經濟協議後，台灣廠商可獲得進入東協及印度市場有利條件，也有利台商進行對印度與東南亞布局，及吸引外商在台投資。
外交人士表示，台星推動簽署經濟合作協議，可視為「立足台灣、連結亞太、布局全球」經濟戰略的另一波啟動，此項聯合新聞稿，啟動了台星有關經濟合作協議可行性的探討，最後的談判結果，仍有待台星雙方作進一步的磋商。
(本篇由助教張貼)
http://www.cna.com.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=FirstNews&ID=201008050001
（中央社記者唐佩君、李佳霏新加坡-台北5日電）駐新加坡代表處及新加坡駐台北代表處今天發表聯合新聞稿，雙方同意在WTO架構下，探討經濟合作協議可行性。這是繼ECFA後，台灣參與區域經貿整合重要一步。
在聯合新聞稿中，台灣將以在世界貿易組織（WTO）下的全名「台灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖個別關稅領域（簡稱中華台北）」與新加坡推動經濟合作協議的簽署，該名稱是2002年民進黨執政時，台灣加入WTO所採用的名稱，這也是當時朝野獲得共識的名稱。
外交人士指出，WTO明文規定其會員享有與該組織其他會員簽署符合WTO規範貿易協定權利，台灣與新加坡同為WTO成員，採用台灣在WTO的名稱、在WTO架構下與其他會員簽署相關經濟合作協議，是參與區域經濟整合最務實的作法。
對未來簽署協議的名稱，外交人士指出，在WTO架構下的區域貿易協定（Regional Trade Agreement）是依據1994關稅暨貿易總協定（GATT 1994）第24條有關自由貿易區（Free Trade Area）及服務貿易總協定（GATS）第5條有關經濟整合的規範簽署，其中並未規定使用「Free Trade Agreement」，所以未來也不會拘泥於此名稱。
外交人士進一步指出，在實務上，星國與其他國家簽署相關協定，也使用其他名稱，如新加坡紐西蘭「緊密經濟夥伴」（closer economic partnership）、新加坡印度「全面經濟合作協定」（Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement）、新加坡日本「經濟夥伴協定」（Economic Partnership Agreement）等。
黨政高層表示，總統馬英九上任後，極力為台灣打造有利的經濟環境，提升台灣的競爭力。簽署ECFA後為求參與經濟整合與推動全球布局，馬總統多次宣示，要推動與其他主要貿易夥伴洽簽經濟合作協議，此次台星發表聯合新聞稿，即將展開簽署經濟合作協議的具體行動，證明馬總統說到做到。
外交人士表示，台灣與新加坡經濟互補大、競爭性小，台星經濟協議對雙方均有利，對台灣農業也無衝擊。台星簽署協議後，對台灣與其他國家洽簽相關經濟合作協議也有正面作用。而藉星國本身為東協會員及已簽署新加坡印度「全面經濟合作協定」的優勢，未來台星簽署經濟協議後，台灣廠商可獲得進入東協及印度市場有利條件，也有利台商進行對印度與東南亞布局，及吸引外商在台投資。
外交人士表示，台星推動簽署經濟合作協議，可視為「立足台灣、連結亞太、布局全球」經濟戰略的另一波啟動，此項聯合新聞稿，啟動了台星有關經濟合作協議可行性的探討，最後的談判結果，仍有待台星雙方作進一步的磋商。
(本篇由助教張貼)
2010年7月24日 星期六
科索沃獨立？ 中塞不承認
科索沃獨立？ 中塞不承認 【7/23 19:25】
http://iservice.libertytimes.com.tw/liveNews/news.php?no=390595&type=%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B
〔本報訊〕聯合國最高司法仲裁機構、總部設在荷蘭海牙的國際法庭今天裁定科索沃獨立合法，雖然海牙法庭的裁決並無任何法律約束力，不過，仍具有極高威信。而繼塞爾維亞發表聲明，「永不承認科索沃獨立」後，中國今天也表示，科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間。
海牙法庭裁今天裁定，2008年片面宣布獨立的柯索沃，並未牴觸國際法，言下之意表示，已經認可科索沃獨立地位。雖然海牙法庭裁決僅有建議性質，無任何法律約束力，但仍具有極高威信，可能牽動全球獨立運動，促使更多國家承認科索沃獨立地位。
裁決結束後，美國國務院發言人克勞里表示，支持國際法庭的判決，「而今是歐洲各國為共同未來團結一致的時刻。」只是，塞爾維亞依舊堅決反對科索沃獨立，塞爾維亞總統塔迪奇表示，絕對不會承認科索臥室一個主權獨立的國家，塞爾維亞外交部長耶雷米奇也表示，如果國際法庭支持科索沃獨立，那麼全球所有邊疆地區都將面臨分裂的危險。
中國今天也發表聲明，表示科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間，中國外交部發言人秦剛說，「中國始終認為，尊重國家主權與領土完整是國際法的基本原則，這是當前全球司法制度的準則。」言下之意指出，中國認為科索沃屬於塞爾維亞的一環，一國的領土完整才能被承認為一個國家。中國甚至特別指出，國際法庭沒有約束力，因此科索沃獨立問題還有討論空間。
2008年2月17日，科索沃自行宣布獨立，目前已獲得69國外交承認，其中包括美國及歐盟22個成員國。而中國、俄國則支持塞爾維亞，原因很簡單，中國內有西藏和新疆獨立問題、俄國內部則是車臣獨立問題，如果科索沃獨立，勢必會引發民族獨立運動，中國和俄國自然也免不了面臨跟塞爾維亞一樣的難題。
http://iservice.libertytimes.com.tw/liveNews/news.php?no=390595&type=%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B
〔本報訊〕聯合國最高司法仲裁機構、總部設在荷蘭海牙的國際法庭今天裁定科索沃獨立合法，雖然海牙法庭的裁決並無任何法律約束力，不過，仍具有極高威信。而繼塞爾維亞發表聲明，「永不承認科索沃獨立」後，中國今天也表示，科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間。
海牙法庭裁今天裁定，2008年片面宣布獨立的柯索沃，並未牴觸國際法，言下之意表示，已經認可科索沃獨立地位。雖然海牙法庭裁決僅有建議性質，無任何法律約束力，但仍具有極高威信，可能牽動全球獨立運動，促使更多國家承認科索沃獨立地位。
裁決結束後，美國國務院發言人克勞里表示，支持國際法庭的判決，「而今是歐洲各國為共同未來團結一致的時刻。」只是，塞爾維亞依舊堅決反對科索沃獨立，塞爾維亞總統塔迪奇表示，絕對不會承認科索臥室一個主權獨立的國家，塞爾維亞外交部長耶雷米奇也表示，如果國際法庭支持科索沃獨立，那麼全球所有邊疆地區都將面臨分裂的危險。
中國今天也發表聲明，表示科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間，中國外交部發言人秦剛說，「中國始終認為，尊重國家主權與領土完整是國際法的基本原則，這是當前全球司法制度的準則。」言下之意指出，中國認為科索沃屬於塞爾維亞的一環，一國的領土完整才能被承認為一個國家。中國甚至特別指出，國際法庭沒有約束力，因此科索沃獨立問題還有討論空間。
2008年2月17日，科索沃自行宣布獨立，目前已獲得69國外交承認，其中包括美國及歐盟22個成員國。而中國、俄國則支持塞爾維亞，原因很簡單，中國內有西藏和新疆獨立問題、俄國內部則是車臣獨立問題，如果科索沃獨立，勢必會引發民族獨立運動，中國和俄國自然也免不了面臨跟塞爾維亞一樣的難題。
2010年7月23日 星期五
Press Release_Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010)
以下內容乃國際法院於今(2010)年7月22日針對科索沃單方面宣布塞爾維亞獨立是否符合國際法一事發表諮詢意見(Advisory Opinion)。
其中，有關片面宣布獨立是否符合國際法之爭議(the question whether the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law)，法院有詳細之論述，僅將相關內容摘錄如下:
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf (latest visited 23 July 2010)
In this fourth part, the Court examines the substance of the request submitted by the General Assembly. It recalls that it has been asked by the General Assembly to assess the accordance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 with “international law”.
The Court first turns its attention to certain questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, against the background of which the question posed falls to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied. In particular, it notes that during the second half of the twentieth century, “the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” and that a “great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right”. The Court observes that there were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context and that “[t]he practice of States in these latter cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases”.
The Court states that several participants in the proceedings have contended that a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity. It “recalls that [this] principle . . . is an important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 2, paragraph 4”, under the terms of which “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
The Court adds that in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, which reflects customary international law (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 101-103, paras. 191-193), the General Assembly reiterated “[t]he principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. This resolution then enumerated various obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial integrity of other sovereign States. The Court points out that, in the same vein, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Conference) stipulated that “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States” (Art. IV). Hence the Court considers that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”.
After recalling that several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence (see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska), the Court “notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. “In the context of Kosovo”, the Court continues, “the Security Council has never taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council.”
Turning to the arguments put forward by a number of participants concerning the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of “remedial secession”, the Court considers that the debates on these points “concern the right to separate from a State”. The Court recalls that “as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly”. It notes that, to answer the question posed, it need only “determine whether the declaration of independence violated either general international law or the lex specialis created by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
The Court concludes that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and accordingly that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.
The Court then examines the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, in order to determine whether the resolution creates special rules, and therefore ensuing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the present request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.
The Court first notes that resolution 1244 (1999) was expressly adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations. The Court observes that “none of the participants has questioned the fact that [this] resolution . . ., which specifically deals with the situation in Kosovo, is part of the law relevant in the . . . situation [under consideration]”.
The Court then addresses the UNMIK regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and which defined the responsibilities relating to the administration of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. It notes that these regulations are adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and thus ultimately from the United Nations Charter. It goes on to state that “[t]he Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law” and that “[i]n that sense it therefore possesses an international legal character”.
The Court further adds that at the same time, “the Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order, created pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), which is applicable only in Kosovo and the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase established by resolution 1244 (1999), matters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than international, law”; the “Constitutional Framework therefore took effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the interim phase”. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law, the Court continues, observing “[i]n particular, [that] the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”.
The Court notes that “neither Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework contains a clause providing for its termination and neither has been repealed; they therefore constituted the international law applicable to the situation prevailing in Kosovo on 17 February 2008”. It concludes from the foregoing that “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework form part of the international law which is to be considered in replying to the question posed by the General Assembly”.
After considering the interpretation of resolution 1244 (1999) itself, the Court concludes that “the object and purpose of [the] resolution . . . was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an interim basis”.
The Court then turns to the question whether resolution 1244 (1999), or the measures adopted thereunder, introduces a specific prohibition on issuing a declaration of independence, applicable to those who adopted the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary for the Court to determine precisely who issued that declaration.
In the part of its Advisory Opinion devoted to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, the Court seeks to establish whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, established under the Constitutional Framework, or whether those who adopted the declaration were acting in a different capacity. On this point, the Court arrives at the conclusion that “the authors of the declaration of independence . . . did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”.
The Court then turns to the question, debated in the proceedings, whether the authors of the declaration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After outlining the arguments submitted by the participants in the proceedings on this point, the Court undertakes a careful reading of resolution 1244 (1999) in order to determine whether that text prohibits the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from declaring independence from the Republic of Serbia.
It first points out that the resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. In this regard, the Court notes that contemporaneous practice of the Security Council shows that “in situations where the Security Council has decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution”. The Court notes that “under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the final status of Kosovo”. It finds that resolution 1244 (1999) “thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo”.
Turning to the question of the addressees of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Court recalls that, when interpreting Security Council resolutions, it must establish, “on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant circumstances, for whom the Security Council intended to create binding legal obligations”. It recalls that “it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations”, more specifically, in this case, on the Kosovo Albanian leadership, but points out that such reference to that leadership or other actors, notwithstanding the somewhat general reference to “all concerned” (para. 14), is missing from the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The Court therefore considers that it cannot accept the argument that resolution 1244 (1999) contains a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. It adds that “nor can such a prohibition be derived from the language of the resolution understood in its context and considering its object and purpose”, and that “[t]he language of . . . resolution 1244 (1999) is at best ambiguous” on the question of whether the resolution creates such a prohibition. The Court notes that the object and purpose of the resolution “is the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, without making any definitive determination on final status issues”.
While the text of paragraph 11 (c) of resolution 1244 (1999) explains that the “main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include . . . [o]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement” (emphasis added), the Court nevertheless states that the phrase “political settlement”, often cited in the proceedings, “does not modify [its] conclusion” that resolution 1244 (1999) does not contain a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. The Court explains that this reference is made within the context of enumerating the responsibilities of the international civil presence, i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and UNMIK, and not of other actors; the Court adds that, as the diverging views presented to it on this matter illustrate, the term “political settlement” is subject to various interpretations. The Court therefore concludes that this part of resolution 1244 (1999) “cannot be construed to include a prohibition, addressed in particular to the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008, against declaring independence”. The Court accordingly finds that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia, and that “[h]ence, the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
Finally, on the question whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 has violated the Constitutional Framework established under the auspices of UNMIK, as argued by a number of States which participated in the proceedings, the Court recalls that it has already held, earlier in its Advisory Opinion, “that [this] declaration of independence . . . was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated”. Accordingly, the Court states that “the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”, and finds that “the declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework”.
(本篇由助教張貼)
其中，有關片面宣布獨立是否符合國際法之爭議(the question whether the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law)，法院有詳細之論述，僅將相關內容摘錄如下:
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf (latest visited 23 July 2010)
In this fourth part, the Court examines the substance of the request submitted by the General Assembly. It recalls that it has been asked by the General Assembly to assess the accordance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 with “international law”.
The Court first turns its attention to certain questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, against the background of which the question posed falls to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied. In particular, it notes that during the second half of the twentieth century, “the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” and that a “great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right”. The Court observes that there were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context and that “[t]he practice of States in these latter cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases”.
The Court states that several participants in the proceedings have contended that a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity. It “recalls that [this] principle . . . is an important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 2, paragraph 4”, under the terms of which “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
The Court adds that in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, which reflects customary international law (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 101-103, paras. 191-193), the General Assembly reiterated “[t]he principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. This resolution then enumerated various obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial integrity of other sovereign States. The Court points out that, in the same vein, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Conference) stipulated that “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States” (Art. IV). Hence the Court considers that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”.
After recalling that several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence (see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska), the Court “notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. “In the context of Kosovo”, the Court continues, “the Security Council has never taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council.”
Turning to the arguments put forward by a number of participants concerning the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of “remedial secession”, the Court considers that the debates on these points “concern the right to separate from a State”. The Court recalls that “as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly”. It notes that, to answer the question posed, it need only “determine whether the declaration of independence violated either general international law or the lex specialis created by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
The Court concludes that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and accordingly that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.
The Court then examines the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, in order to determine whether the resolution creates special rules, and therefore ensuing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the present request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.
The Court first notes that resolution 1244 (1999) was expressly adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations. The Court observes that “none of the participants has questioned the fact that [this] resolution . . ., which specifically deals with the situation in Kosovo, is part of the law relevant in the . . . situation [under consideration]”.
The Court then addresses the UNMIK regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and which defined the responsibilities relating to the administration of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. It notes that these regulations are adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and thus ultimately from the United Nations Charter. It goes on to state that “[t]he Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law” and that “[i]n that sense it therefore possesses an international legal character”.
The Court further adds that at the same time, “the Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order, created pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), which is applicable only in Kosovo and the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase established by resolution 1244 (1999), matters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than international, law”; the “Constitutional Framework therefore took effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the interim phase”. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law, the Court continues, observing “[i]n particular, [that] the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”.
The Court notes that “neither Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework contains a clause providing for its termination and neither has been repealed; they therefore constituted the international law applicable to the situation prevailing in Kosovo on 17 February 2008”. It concludes from the foregoing that “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework form part of the international law which is to be considered in replying to the question posed by the General Assembly”.
After considering the interpretation of resolution 1244 (1999) itself, the Court concludes that “the object and purpose of [the] resolution . . . was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an interim basis”.
The Court then turns to the question whether resolution 1244 (1999), or the measures adopted thereunder, introduces a specific prohibition on issuing a declaration of independence, applicable to those who adopted the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary for the Court to determine precisely who issued that declaration.
In the part of its Advisory Opinion devoted to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, the Court seeks to establish whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, established under the Constitutional Framework, or whether those who adopted the declaration were acting in a different capacity. On this point, the Court arrives at the conclusion that “the authors of the declaration of independence . . . did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”.
The Court then turns to the question, debated in the proceedings, whether the authors of the declaration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After outlining the arguments submitted by the participants in the proceedings on this point, the Court undertakes a careful reading of resolution 1244 (1999) in order to determine whether that text prohibits the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from declaring independence from the Republic of Serbia.
It first points out that the resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. In this regard, the Court notes that contemporaneous practice of the Security Council shows that “in situations where the Security Council has decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution”. The Court notes that “under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the final status of Kosovo”. It finds that resolution 1244 (1999) “thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo”.
Turning to the question of the addressees of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Court recalls that, when interpreting Security Council resolutions, it must establish, “on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant circumstances, for whom the Security Council intended to create binding legal obligations”. It recalls that “it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations”, more specifically, in this case, on the Kosovo Albanian leadership, but points out that such reference to that leadership or other actors, notwithstanding the somewhat general reference to “all concerned” (para. 14), is missing from the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The Court therefore considers that it cannot accept the argument that resolution 1244 (1999) contains a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. It adds that “nor can such a prohibition be derived from the language of the resolution understood in its context and considering its object and purpose”, and that “[t]he language of . . . resolution 1244 (1999) is at best ambiguous” on the question of whether the resolution creates such a prohibition. The Court notes that the object and purpose of the resolution “is the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, without making any definitive determination on final status issues”.
While the text of paragraph 11 (c) of resolution 1244 (1999) explains that the “main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include . . . [o]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement” (emphasis added), the Court nevertheless states that the phrase “political settlement”, often cited in the proceedings, “does not modify [its] conclusion” that resolution 1244 (1999) does not contain a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. The Court explains that this reference is made within the context of enumerating the responsibilities of the international civil presence, i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and UNMIK, and not of other actors; the Court adds that, as the diverging views presented to it on this matter illustrate, the term “political settlement” is subject to various interpretations. The Court therefore concludes that this part of resolution 1244 (1999) “cannot be construed to include a prohibition, addressed in particular to the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008, against declaring independence”. The Court accordingly finds that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia, and that “[h]ence, the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
Finally, on the question whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 has violated the Constitutional Framework established under the auspices of UNMIK, as argued by a number of States which participated in the proceedings, the Court recalls that it has already held, earlier in its Advisory Opinion, “that [this] declaration of independence . . . was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated”. Accordingly, the Court states that “the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”, and finds that “the declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework”.
(本篇由助教張貼)
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