科索沃獨立？ 中塞不承認 【7/23 19:25】
http://iservice.libertytimes.com.tw/liveNews/news.php?no=390595&type=%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B
〔本報訊〕聯合國最高司法仲裁機構、總部設在荷蘭海牙的國際法庭今天裁定科索沃獨立合法，雖然海牙法庭的裁決並無任何法律約束力，不過，仍具有極高威信。而繼塞爾維亞發表聲明，「永不承認科索沃獨立」後，中國今天也表示，科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間。
海牙法庭裁今天裁定，2008年片面宣布獨立的柯索沃，並未牴觸國際法，言下之意表示，已經認可科索沃獨立地位。雖然海牙法庭裁決僅有建議性質，無任何法律約束力，但仍具有極高威信，可能牽動全球獨立運動，促使更多國家承認科索沃獨立地位。
裁決結束後，美國國務院發言人克勞里表示，支持國際法庭的判決，「而今是歐洲各國為共同未來團結一致的時刻。」只是，塞爾維亞依舊堅決反對科索沃獨立，塞爾維亞總統塔迪奇表示，絕對不會承認科索臥室一個主權獨立的國家，塞爾維亞外交部長耶雷米奇也表示，如果國際法庭支持科索沃獨立，那麼全球所有邊疆地區都將面臨分裂的危險。
中國今天也發表聲明，表示科索沃的國際地位還有討論空間，中國外交部發言人秦剛說，「中國始終認為，尊重國家主權與領土完整是國際法的基本原則，這是當前全球司法制度的準則。」言下之意指出，中國認為科索沃屬於塞爾維亞的一環，一國的領土完整才能被承認為一個國家。中國甚至特別指出，國際法庭沒有約束力，因此科索沃獨立問題還有討論空間。
2008年2月17日，科索沃自行宣布獨立，目前已獲得69國外交承認，其中包括美國及歐盟22個成員國。而中國、俄國則支持塞爾維亞，原因很簡單，中國內有西藏和新疆獨立問題、俄國內部則是車臣獨立問題，如果科索沃獨立，勢必會引發民族獨立運動，中國和俄國自然也免不了面臨跟塞爾維亞一樣的難題。
2010年7月24日 星期六
2010年7月23日 星期五
Press Release_Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010)
以下內容乃國際法院於今(2010)年7月22日針對科索沃單方面宣布塞爾維亞獨立是否符合國際法一事發表諮詢意見(Advisory Opinion)。
其中，有關片面宣布獨立是否符合國際法之爭議(the question whether the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law)，法院有詳細之論述，僅將相關內容摘錄如下:
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf (latest visited 23 July 2010)
In this fourth part, the Court examines the substance of the request submitted by the General Assembly. It recalls that it has been asked by the General Assembly to assess the accordance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 with “international law”.
The Court first turns its attention to certain questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, against the background of which the question posed falls to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied. In particular, it notes that during the second half of the twentieth century, “the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” and that a “great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right”. The Court observes that there were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context and that “[t]he practice of States in these latter cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases”.
The Court states that several participants in the proceedings have contended that a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity. It “recalls that [this] principle . . . is an important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 2, paragraph 4”, under the terms of which “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
The Court adds that in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, which reflects customary international law (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 101-103, paras. 191-193), the General Assembly reiterated “[t]he principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. This resolution then enumerated various obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial integrity of other sovereign States. The Court points out that, in the same vein, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Conference) stipulated that “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States” (Art. IV). Hence the Court considers that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”.
After recalling that several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence (see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska), the Court “notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. “In the context of Kosovo”, the Court continues, “the Security Council has never taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council.”
Turning to the arguments put forward by a number of participants concerning the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of “remedial secession”, the Court considers that the debates on these points “concern the right to separate from a State”. The Court recalls that “as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly”. It notes that, to answer the question posed, it need only “determine whether the declaration of independence violated either general international law or the lex specialis created by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
The Court concludes that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and accordingly that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.
The Court then examines the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, in order to determine whether the resolution creates special rules, and therefore ensuing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the present request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.
The Court first notes that resolution 1244 (1999) was expressly adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations. The Court observes that “none of the participants has questioned the fact that [this] resolution . . ., which specifically deals with the situation in Kosovo, is part of the law relevant in the . . . situation [under consideration]”.
The Court then addresses the UNMIK regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and which defined the responsibilities relating to the administration of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. It notes that these regulations are adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and thus ultimately from the United Nations Charter. It goes on to state that “[t]he Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law” and that “[i]n that sense it therefore possesses an international legal character”.
The Court further adds that at the same time, “the Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order, created pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), which is applicable only in Kosovo and the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase established by resolution 1244 (1999), matters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than international, law”; the “Constitutional Framework therefore took effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the interim phase”. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law, the Court continues, observing “[i]n particular, [that] the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”.
The Court notes that “neither Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework contains a clause providing for its termination and neither has been repealed; they therefore constituted the international law applicable to the situation prevailing in Kosovo on 17 February 2008”. It concludes from the foregoing that “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework form part of the international law which is to be considered in replying to the question posed by the General Assembly”.
After considering the interpretation of resolution 1244 (1999) itself, the Court concludes that “the object and purpose of [the] resolution . . . was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an interim basis”.
The Court then turns to the question whether resolution 1244 (1999), or the measures adopted thereunder, introduces a specific prohibition on issuing a declaration of independence, applicable to those who adopted the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary for the Court to determine precisely who issued that declaration.
In the part of its Advisory Opinion devoted to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, the Court seeks to establish whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, established under the Constitutional Framework, or whether those who adopted the declaration were acting in a different capacity. On this point, the Court arrives at the conclusion that “the authors of the declaration of independence . . . did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”.
The Court then turns to the question, debated in the proceedings, whether the authors of the declaration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After outlining the arguments submitted by the participants in the proceedings on this point, the Court undertakes a careful reading of resolution 1244 (1999) in order to determine whether that text prohibits the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from declaring independence from the Republic of Serbia.
It first points out that the resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. In this regard, the Court notes that contemporaneous practice of the Security Council shows that “in situations where the Security Council has decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution”. The Court notes that “under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the final status of Kosovo”. It finds that resolution 1244 (1999) “thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo”.
Turning to the question of the addressees of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Court recalls that, when interpreting Security Council resolutions, it must establish, “on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant circumstances, for whom the Security Council intended to create binding legal obligations”. It recalls that “it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations”, more specifically, in this case, on the Kosovo Albanian leadership, but points out that such reference to that leadership or other actors, notwithstanding the somewhat general reference to “all concerned” (para. 14), is missing from the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The Court therefore considers that it cannot accept the argument that resolution 1244 (1999) contains a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. It adds that “nor can such a prohibition be derived from the language of the resolution understood in its context and considering its object and purpose”, and that “[t]he language of . . . resolution 1244 (1999) is at best ambiguous” on the question of whether the resolution creates such a prohibition. The Court notes that the object and purpose of the resolution “is the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, without making any definitive determination on final status issues”.
While the text of paragraph 11 (c) of resolution 1244 (1999) explains that the “main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include . . . [o]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement” (emphasis added), the Court nevertheless states that the phrase “political settlement”, often cited in the proceedings, “does not modify [its] conclusion” that resolution 1244 (1999) does not contain a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. The Court explains that this reference is made within the context of enumerating the responsibilities of the international civil presence, i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and UNMIK, and not of other actors; the Court adds that, as the diverging views presented to it on this matter illustrate, the term “political settlement” is subject to various interpretations. The Court therefore concludes that this part of resolution 1244 (1999) “cannot be construed to include a prohibition, addressed in particular to the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008, against declaring independence”. The Court accordingly finds that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia, and that “[h]ence, the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
Finally, on the question whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 has violated the Constitutional Framework established under the auspices of UNMIK, as argued by a number of States which participated in the proceedings, the Court recalls that it has already held, earlier in its Advisory Opinion, “that [this] declaration of independence . . . was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated”. Accordingly, the Court states that “the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”, and finds that “the declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework”.
(本篇由助教張貼)
其中，有關片面宣布獨立是否符合國際法之爭議(the question whether the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law)，法院有詳細之論述，僅將相關內容摘錄如下:
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf (latest visited 23 July 2010)
In this fourth part, the Court examines the substance of the request submitted by the General Assembly. It recalls that it has been asked by the General Assembly to assess the accordance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 with “international law”.
The Court first turns its attention to certain questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, against the background of which the question posed falls to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied. In particular, it notes that during the second half of the twentieth century, “the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” and that a “great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right”. The Court observes that there were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context and that “[t]he practice of States in these latter cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases”.
The Court states that several participants in the proceedings have contended that a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity. It “recalls that [this] principle . . . is an important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 2, paragraph 4”, under the terms of which “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.
The Court adds that in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, which reflects customary international law (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 101-103, paras. 191-193), the General Assembly reiterated “[t]he principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. This resolution then enumerated various obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial integrity of other sovereign States. The Court points out that, in the same vein, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Conference) stipulated that “[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States” (Art. IV). Hence the Court considers that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”.
After recalling that several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence (see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska), the Court “notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)”. “In the context of Kosovo”, the Court continues, “the Security Council has never taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council.”
Turning to the arguments put forward by a number of participants concerning the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of any right of “remedial secession”, the Court considers that the debates on these points “concern the right to separate from a State”. The Court recalls that “as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly”. It notes that, to answer the question posed, it need only “determine whether the declaration of independence violated either general international law or the lex specialis created by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
The Court concludes that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and accordingly that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.
The Court then examines the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, in order to determine whether the resolution creates special rules, and therefore ensuing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the present request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.
The Court first notes that resolution 1244 (1999) was expressly adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and therefore clearly imposes international legal obligations. The Court observes that “none of the participants has questioned the fact that [this] resolution . . ., which specifically deals with the situation in Kosovo, is part of the law relevant in the . . . situation [under consideration]”.
The Court then addresses the UNMIK regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and which defined the responsibilities relating to the administration of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. It notes that these regulations are adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of the authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and thus ultimately from the United Nations Charter. It goes on to state that “[t]he Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law” and that “[i]n that sense it therefore possesses an international legal character”.
The Court further adds that at the same time, “the Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order, created pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), which is applicable only in Kosovo and the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase established by resolution 1244 (1999), matters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than international, law”; the “Constitutional Framework therefore took effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the interim phase”. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law, the Court continues, observing “[i]n particular, [that] the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”.
The Court notes that “neither Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework contains a clause providing for its termination and neither has been repealed; they therefore constituted the international law applicable to the situation prevailing in Kosovo on 17 February 2008”. It concludes from the foregoing that “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework form part of the international law which is to be considered in replying to the question posed by the General Assembly”.
After considering the interpretation of resolution 1244 (1999) itself, the Court concludes that “the object and purpose of [the] resolution . . . was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an interim basis”.
The Court then turns to the question whether resolution 1244 (1999), or the measures adopted thereunder, introduces a specific prohibition on issuing a declaration of independence, applicable to those who adopted the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary for the Court to determine precisely who issued that declaration.
In the part of its Advisory Opinion devoted to the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, the Court seeks to establish whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, established under the Constitutional Framework, or whether those who adopted the declaration were acting in a different capacity. On this point, the Court arrives at the conclusion that “the authors of the declaration of independence . . . did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration”.
The Court then turns to the question, debated in the proceedings, whether the authors of the declaration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After outlining the arguments submitted by the participants in the proceedings on this point, the Court undertakes a careful reading of resolution 1244 (1999) in order to determine whether that text prohibits the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from declaring independence from the Republic of Serbia.
It first points out that the resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. In this regard, the Court notes that contemporaneous practice of the Security Council shows that “in situations where the Security Council has decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution”. The Court notes that “under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the final status of Kosovo”. It finds that resolution 1244 (1999) “thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo”.
Turning to the question of the addressees of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Court recalls that, when interpreting Security Council resolutions, it must establish, “on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant circumstances, for whom the Security Council intended to create binding legal obligations”. It recalls that “it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations”, more specifically, in this case, on the Kosovo Albanian leadership, but points out that such reference to that leadership or other actors, notwithstanding the somewhat general reference to “all concerned” (para. 14), is missing from the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The Court therefore considers that it cannot accept the argument that resolution 1244 (1999) contains a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. It adds that “nor can such a prohibition be derived from the language of the resolution understood in its context and considering its object and purpose”, and that “[t]he language of . . . resolution 1244 (1999) is at best ambiguous” on the question of whether the resolution creates such a prohibition. The Court notes that the object and purpose of the resolution “is the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, without making any definitive determination on final status issues”.
While the text of paragraph 11 (c) of resolution 1244 (1999) explains that the “main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include . . . [o]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement” (emphasis added), the Court nevertheless states that the phrase “political settlement”, often cited in the proceedings, “does not modify [its] conclusion” that resolution 1244 (1999) does not contain a prohibition, binding on the authors of the declaration of independence, against declaring independence. The Court explains that this reference is made within the context of enumerating the responsibilities of the international civil presence, i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and UNMIK, and not of other actors; the Court adds that, as the diverging views presented to it on this matter illustrate, the term “political settlement” is subject to various interpretations. The Court therefore concludes that this part of resolution 1244 (1999) “cannot be construed to include a prohibition, addressed in particular to the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008, against declaring independence”. The Court accordingly finds that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia, and that “[h]ence, the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”.
Finally, on the question whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 has violated the Constitutional Framework established under the auspices of UNMIK, as argued by a number of States which participated in the proceedings, the Court recalls that it has already held, earlier in its Advisory Opinion, “that [this] declaration of independence . . . was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated”. Accordingly, the Court states that “the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”, and finds that “the declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework”.
(本篇由助教張貼)
國際法庭：科索伏獨立 沒有違法
聯合國國際法庭22日就科索伏2008年片面宣布脫離塞爾維亞獨立案做成裁決，認為科索伏獨立並未違反國際法。專家認為，國際法庭的裁決雖然不具拘束力，卻可能對全球各地的分離運動造成深遠的影響。
國際法庭庭長小和田恆表示，科索伏「2008年2月17日片面宣布獨立，並未違反一般國際法。」
塞爾維亞外長葉雷米契在裁決出爐前警告說，要是國際法庭支持科索伏「分離」，各國疆界隨時都有變動的風險。裁決出爐後，塞國總統塔迪奇表示永遠不會承認科索伏獨立。美國副總統拜登隨即致電塔迪奇，重申「美國力挺科索伏主權與領土完整的承諾不會動搖」。
聯合國大會在塞爾維亞要求之下，2008年10月請求國際法庭裁決科索伏片面宣布獨立的合法性。科索伏已經獲得69國承認為獨立國家，包括美國和22個歐盟國家，但是中國和俄國都未予以承認，國際法庭的裁決預料不致讓這些國家改變心意。
荷蘭「國關中心」安全與衝突部門主任貝克指出，國際法庭的裁決對於面臨分離運動的幾個國家來說，是個壞消息，「這些政府向來認為國土不容分裂，將視此裁決為對國家主權的嚴重威脅。」
貝克也說，國際法庭的裁決只表示片面宣布獨立不違法，並未提及宣布獨立的後果，因此能援引科索伏經驗的案例有限。他以緬甸的克倫族、伊拉克的庫德族和印度的喀什米爾為例，歐洲的巴斯克和賽普勒斯則難以比照辦理。
【2010/07/23 聯合報】 @ http://udn.com/
國際法庭庭長小和田恆表示，科索伏「2008年2月17日片面宣布獨立，並未違反一般國際法。」
塞爾維亞外長葉雷米契在裁決出爐前警告說，要是國際法庭支持科索伏「分離」，各國疆界隨時都有變動的風險。裁決出爐後，塞國總統塔迪奇表示永遠不會承認科索伏獨立。美國副總統拜登隨即致電塔迪奇，重申「美國力挺科索伏主權與領土完整的承諾不會動搖」。
聯合國大會在塞爾維亞要求之下，2008年10月請求國際法庭裁決科索伏片面宣布獨立的合法性。科索伏已經獲得69國承認為獨立國家，包括美國和22個歐盟國家，但是中國和俄國都未予以承認，國際法庭的裁決預料不致讓這些國家改變心意。
荷蘭「國關中心」安全與衝突部門主任貝克指出，國際法庭的裁決對於面臨分離運動的幾個國家來說，是個壞消息，「這些政府向來認為國土不容分裂，將視此裁決為對國家主權的嚴重威脅。」
貝克也說，國際法庭的裁決只表示片面宣布獨立不違法，並未提及宣布獨立的後果，因此能援引科索伏經驗的案例有限。他以緬甸的克倫族、伊拉克的庫德族和印度的喀什米爾為例，歐洲的巴斯克和賽普勒斯則難以比照辦理。
【2010/07/23 聯合報】 @ http://udn.com/
2010年7月4日 星期日
海峽兩岸智慧財產權保護合作協議
海峽兩岸智慧財產權保護合作協議
（本協議尚待完成相關程序後生效）
為保障海峽兩岸人民權益，促進兩岸經濟、科技與文化發展，財團法人海峽交流基金會與海峽兩岸關係協會就兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）保護合作事宜，經平等協商，達成協議如下：
一、合作目標
雙方同意本著平等互惠原則，加強專利、商標、著作權及植物品種權（植物新品種權）（以下簡稱品種權）等兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）保護方面的交流與合作，協商解決相關問題，提升兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）的創新、應用、管理及保護。
二、優先權利
雙方同意依各自規定，確認對方專利、商標及品種權第一次申請日的效力，並積極推動做出相應安排，保障兩岸人民的優先權權益。
三、保護品種
雙方同意在各自公告的植物種類（植物品種保護名錄）範圍內受理對方品種權的申請，並就擴大可申請品種權之植物種類（植物品種保護名錄）進行協商。
四、審查合作
雙方同意推動相互利用專利檢索與審查結果、品種權審查和測試等合作及協商。
五、業界合作
雙方同意促進兩岸專利、商標等業界合作，提供有效、便捷服務。
六、認證服務
雙方同意為促進兩岸著作權貿易，建立著作權認證合作機制，於一方影音（音像）製品於他方出版時，得由一方指定之相關協會或團體辦理著作權認證，並就建立圖書、電腦程式（軟件）等其他作品、製品認證制度交換意見。
七、協處機制
雙方同意建立執法協處機制，依各自規定妥善處理下列智慧財產權（知識產權）保護事宜：
（一） 打擊盜版及仿冒，特別是查處經由網路（網絡）提供或幫助提供盜版圖書、影音（音像）及電腦程式（軟件）等侵權網站，以及在市場流通的盜版及仿冒品；
（二） 保護著名（馳名）商標、地理標誌或著名產地名稱，共同防止惡意搶註行為，並保障權利人行使申請撤銷被搶註著名（馳名）商標、地理標誌或著名產地名稱的權利；
（三） 強化水果及其他農產品虛偽產地標示（識）之市場監管及查處措施；
（四） 其他智慧財產權（知識產權）保護事宜。
在處理上述權益保護事宜時，雙方可相互提供必要的資訊，並通報處理結果。
八、業務交流
雙方同意開展智慧財產權（知識產權）業務交流與合作事項如下：
（一） 推動業務主管部門人員進行工作會晤、考察參訪、經驗和技術交流、舉辦研討會等，開展相關業務培訓；
（二） 交換制度規範、資料庫（數據文獻資料）及其他相關資訊；
（三） 推動相關文件電子交換合作；
（四） 促進著作權集體管理組織交流與合作；
（五） 加強對相關企業、代理人及公眾的宣導；
（六） 雙方同意之其他合作事項。
九、工作規劃
雙方同意分別設置專利、商標、著作權及品種權等工作組，負責商定具體工作規劃及方案。
十、保密義務
雙方同意對於在執行本協議相關活動中所獲資訊予以保密。但依請求目的使用者，不在此限。
十一、限制用途
雙方同意僅依請求目的使用對方提供之資料。但雙方另有約定者，不在此限。
十二、文書格式
雙方同意交換、通報、查詢資訊及日常業務聯繫等，使用商定的文書格式。
十三、聯繫主體
本協議議定事項，由雙方業務主管部門指定的聯絡人相互聯繫實施。必要時，經雙方同意得指定其他單位進行聯繫。
本協議其他相關事宜，由財團法人海峽交流基金會與海峽兩岸關係協會聯繫。
十四、協議履行與變更
雙方應遵守協議。
本協議變更，應經雙方協商同意，並以書面形式確認。
十五、爭議解決
因適用本協議所生爭議，雙方應儘速協商解決。
十六、未盡事宜
本協議如有未盡事宜，雙方得以適當方式另行商定。
十七、簽署生效
本協議簽署後，雙方應各自完成相關程序並以書面通知對方。本協議自雙方均收到對方通知後次日起生效。
本協議於六月二十九日簽署，一式四份，雙方各執兩份。
財團法人海峽交流基金會 海峽兩岸關係協會
董事長 江丙坤 會長 陳雲林
(本篇由助教張貼)
（本協議尚待完成相關程序後生效）
為保障海峽兩岸人民權益，促進兩岸經濟、科技與文化發展，財團法人海峽交流基金會與海峽兩岸關係協會就兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）保護合作事宜，經平等協商，達成協議如下：
一、合作目標
雙方同意本著平等互惠原則，加強專利、商標、著作權及植物品種權（植物新品種權）（以下簡稱品種權）等兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）保護方面的交流與合作，協商解決相關問題，提升兩岸智慧財產權（知識產權）的創新、應用、管理及保護。
二、優先權利
雙方同意依各自規定，確認對方專利、商標及品種權第一次申請日的效力，並積極推動做出相應安排，保障兩岸人民的優先權權益。
三、保護品種
雙方同意在各自公告的植物種類（植物品種保護名錄）範圍內受理對方品種權的申請，並就擴大可申請品種權之植物種類（植物品種保護名錄）進行協商。
四、審查合作
雙方同意推動相互利用專利檢索與審查結果、品種權審查和測試等合作及協商。
五、業界合作
雙方同意促進兩岸專利、商標等業界合作，提供有效、便捷服務。
六、認證服務
雙方同意為促進兩岸著作權貿易，建立著作權認證合作機制，於一方影音（音像）製品於他方出版時，得由一方指定之相關協會或團體辦理著作權認證，並就建立圖書、電腦程式（軟件）等其他作品、製品認證制度交換意見。
七、協處機制
雙方同意建立執法協處機制，依各自規定妥善處理下列智慧財產權（知識產權）保護事宜：
（一） 打擊盜版及仿冒，特別是查處經由網路（網絡）提供或幫助提供盜版圖書、影音（音像）及電腦程式（軟件）等侵權網站，以及在市場流通的盜版及仿冒品；
（二） 保護著名（馳名）商標、地理標誌或著名產地名稱，共同防止惡意搶註行為，並保障權利人行使申請撤銷被搶註著名（馳名）商標、地理標誌或著名產地名稱的權利；
（三） 強化水果及其他農產品虛偽產地標示（識）之市場監管及查處措施；
（四） 其他智慧財產權（知識產權）保護事宜。
在處理上述權益保護事宜時，雙方可相互提供必要的資訊，並通報處理結果。
八、業務交流
雙方同意開展智慧財產權（知識產權）業務交流與合作事項如下：
（一） 推動業務主管部門人員進行工作會晤、考察參訪、經驗和技術交流、舉辦研討會等，開展相關業務培訓；
（二） 交換制度規範、資料庫（數據文獻資料）及其他相關資訊；
（三） 推動相關文件電子交換合作；
（四） 促進著作權集體管理組織交流與合作；
（五） 加強對相關企業、代理人及公眾的宣導；
（六） 雙方同意之其他合作事項。
九、工作規劃
雙方同意分別設置專利、商標、著作權及品種權等工作組，負責商定具體工作規劃及方案。
十、保密義務
雙方同意對於在執行本協議相關活動中所獲資訊予以保密。但依請求目的使用者，不在此限。
十一、限制用途
雙方同意僅依請求目的使用對方提供之資料。但雙方另有約定者，不在此限。
十二、文書格式
雙方同意交換、通報、查詢資訊及日常業務聯繫等，使用商定的文書格式。
十三、聯繫主體
本協議議定事項，由雙方業務主管部門指定的聯絡人相互聯繫實施。必要時，經雙方同意得指定其他單位進行聯繫。
本協議其他相關事宜，由財團法人海峽交流基金會與海峽兩岸關係協會聯繫。
十四、協議履行與變更
雙方應遵守協議。
本協議變更，應經雙方協商同意，並以書面形式確認。
十五、爭議解決
因適用本協議所生爭議，雙方應儘速協商解決。
十六、未盡事宜
本協議如有未盡事宜，雙方得以適當方式另行商定。
十七、簽署生效
本協議簽署後，雙方應各自完成相關程序並以書面通知對方。本協議自雙方均收到對方通知後次日起生效。
本協議於六月二十九日簽署，一式四份，雙方各執兩份。
財團法人海峽交流基金會 海峽兩岸關係協會
董事長 江丙坤 會長 陳雲林
(本篇由助教張貼)
2010年7月2日 星期五
兩岸經濟合作架構協議附件五: 適用於服務貿易早期收穫部門及開放措施的服務提供者定義
雙方同意，就「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」附件四（以下簡稱附件四）所列並超出各自在世界貿易組織承諾的服務部門及開放措施訂定適用的服務提供者定義(註1)如下：
一、適用於服務貿易早期收穫部門及開放措施的服務提供者，指為另一方提供服務的一方自然人或一方法人。(註2)
（一）「一方自然人」指持有兩岸任一方身分證明文件的自然人；
（二）「一方法人」指根據兩岸任一方相關規定在該方設立的實體，包括任何公司、信託、合夥、合資、獨資或協會(商會)。
二、一方法人服務提供者應同時具備下列條件：
（一）在該方提供服務的性質和範圍，應包含其擬在另一方提供服務的性質和範圍； (註3)
（二）在該方從事實質性商業經營，應符合下列規定：
1.在該方從事與擬在另一方提供服務的性質和範圍相同的商業經營持續三年以上 (註4)。其中：
從事銀行及其他金融服務（不包括證券期貨和保險）的一方銀行機構，應在該方獲得銀行業監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
從事證券期貨及其相關服務的一方證券期貨公司，應在該方獲得證券期貨監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
從事保險及其相關服務的一方保險公司，應在該方獲得保險業監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
2.在該方繳納所得稅；
3.在該方擁有或租用經營場所。
三、一方服務提供者為享有附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的優惠待遇，應按下列規定向該方業務主管部門或其委託機構提供文件、資料，申請「服務提供者證明書」：
（一）一方自然人服務提供者應提供身分證明文件，及業務主管部門或其委託機構認為需要提供的其他文件、資料；
（二）一方法人服務提供者應提供：
1.註冊登記證明影本；
2.最近三年或五年的完稅證明影本；
3.最近三年或五年經會計師簽證的財務報表；
4.擁有或租用經營場所的證明文件或其影本；
5.其他證明提供服務性質和範圍的文件或其影本；
6.業務主管部門或其委託機構認為需要提供的其他文件、資料。
四、一方服務提供者按本附件第三點規定提供相關文件、資料，業務主管部門或其委託機構認為符合本附件規定，向其核發服務提供者證明書。
五、一方服務提供者申請在另一方提供附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的服務時，應向另一方的相關業務主管部門提交有效的服務提供者證明書，及申請所涉服務部門規定的文件、資料。
六、已在另一方提供服務的一方服務提供者可按照本附件的相關規定申請取得服務提供者證明書，以享有附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的優惠待遇。
註1: 僅適用於以商業據點呈現模式提供服務的服務提供者。
註2: 不包括在一方登記的分公司、辦事處、聯絡處和其他非法人機構。
註3: 就臺灣方面醫療服務提供者而言，包括：（1）法人醫療機構；（2）醫療機構的設置人；（3）醫療機構設置的特定目的公司。
註4: 就臺灣方面醫療服務提供者而言，註3規定的醫療機構應符合此項規定。
(本篇由助教張貼)
一、適用於服務貿易早期收穫部門及開放措施的服務提供者，指為另一方提供服務的一方自然人或一方法人。(註2)
（一）「一方自然人」指持有兩岸任一方身分證明文件的自然人；
（二）「一方法人」指根據兩岸任一方相關規定在該方設立的實體，包括任何公司、信託、合夥、合資、獨資或協會(商會)。
二、一方法人服務提供者應同時具備下列條件：
（一）在該方提供服務的性質和範圍，應包含其擬在另一方提供服務的性質和範圍； (註3)
（二）在該方從事實質性商業經營，應符合下列規定：
1.在該方從事與擬在另一方提供服務的性質和範圍相同的商業經營持續三年以上 (註4)。其中：
從事銀行及其他金融服務（不包括證券期貨和保險）的一方銀行機構，應在該方獲得銀行業監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
從事證券期貨及其相關服務的一方證券期貨公司，應在該方獲得證券期貨監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
從事保險及其相關服務的一方保險公司，應在該方獲得保險業監督管理機構營業許可並註冊或登記設立且從事商業經營持續五年以上；
2.在該方繳納所得稅；
3.在該方擁有或租用經營場所。
三、一方服務提供者為享有附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的優惠待遇，應按下列規定向該方業務主管部門或其委託機構提供文件、資料，申請「服務提供者證明書」：
（一）一方自然人服務提供者應提供身分證明文件，及業務主管部門或其委託機構認為需要提供的其他文件、資料；
（二）一方法人服務提供者應提供：
1.註冊登記證明影本；
2.最近三年或五年的完稅證明影本；
3.最近三年或五年經會計師簽證的財務報表；
4.擁有或租用經營場所的證明文件或其影本；
5.其他證明提供服務性質和範圍的文件或其影本；
6.業務主管部門或其委託機構認為需要提供的其他文件、資料。
四、一方服務提供者按本附件第三點規定提供相關文件、資料，業務主管部門或其委託機構認為符合本附件規定，向其核發服務提供者證明書。
五、一方服務提供者申請在另一方提供附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的服務時，應向另一方的相關業務主管部門提交有效的服務提供者證明書，及申請所涉服務部門規定的文件、資料。
六、已在另一方提供服務的一方服務提供者可按照本附件的相關規定申請取得服務提供者證明書，以享有附件四所列並超出在世界貿易組織承諾的優惠待遇。
註1: 僅適用於以商業據點呈現模式提供服務的服務提供者。
註2: 不包括在一方登記的分公司、辦事處、聯絡處和其他非法人機構。
註3: 就臺灣方面醫療服務提供者而言，包括：（1）法人醫療機構；（2）醫療機構的設置人；（3）醫療機構設置的特定目的公司。
註4: 就臺灣方面醫療服務提供者而言，註3規定的醫療機構應符合此項規定。
(本篇由助教張貼)
海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議附件三: 適用於貨品貿易早期收穫產品的雙方防衛措施
一、 進口方因履行早期收穫計畫，導致從另一方進口特定產品的數量絕對增加或與其產量相比相對增加，且此種情況已對其生產同類或直接競爭產品的產業造成嚴重損害或嚴重損害之虞，進口方可要求與另一方進行磋商，以尋求雙方滿意的解決方案。
根據上述規定，經調查，如一方決定採取雙方防衛措施，可將所涉產品適用的關稅稅率提高至採取雙方防衛措施時實施的普遍適用於世界貿易組織會員的非臨時性進口關稅稅率。
二、 雙方防衛措施的實施期限應儘可能縮短，並以消除或防止進口方產業受到損害的範圍為限，最長不超過一年。
三、 當一方終止針對某一產品實施的雙方防衛措施時，該產品的關稅稅率應根據「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」附件一所規定的降稅模式，按照該措施終止時的關稅稅率執行。
四、 實施雙方防衛措施時，對於本附件中未規定的規則，雙方應準用世界貿易組織「防衛協定」，但世界貿易組織「防衛協定」第五條所列的數量限制措施及第九條、第十三條、第十四條不適用。
五、 本附件準用世界貿易組織「防衛協定」條款時所稱的「貨品貿易理事會」或「防衛委員會」均指「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」所稱的「兩岸經濟合作委員會」。
六、 一方不得對另一方同一產品同時實施以下措施：
（一）雙方防衛措施；
（二）「一九九四年關稅暨貿易總協定」第十九條及世界貿易組織「防衛協定」規定的措施。
(本篇由助教發布)
根據上述規定，經調查，如一方決定採取雙方防衛措施，可將所涉產品適用的關稅稅率提高至採取雙方防衛措施時實施的普遍適用於世界貿易組織會員的非臨時性進口關稅稅率。
二、 雙方防衛措施的實施期限應儘可能縮短，並以消除或防止進口方產業受到損害的範圍為限，最長不超過一年。
三、 當一方終止針對某一產品實施的雙方防衛措施時，該產品的關稅稅率應根據「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」附件一所規定的降稅模式，按照該措施終止時的關稅稅率執行。
四、 實施雙方防衛措施時，對於本附件中未規定的規則，雙方應準用世界貿易組織「防衛協定」，但世界貿易組織「防衛協定」第五條所列的數量限制措施及第九條、第十三條、第十四條不適用。
五、 本附件準用世界貿易組織「防衛協定」條款時所稱的「貨品貿易理事會」或「防衛委員會」均指「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」所稱的「兩岸經濟合作委員會」。
六、 一方不得對另一方同一產品同時實施以下措施：
（一）雙方防衛措施；
（二）「一九九四年關稅暨貿易總協定」第十九條及世界貿易組織「防衛協定」規定的措施。
(本篇由助教發布)
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