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柬埔寨要求國際法庭重新解釋1962年對普里維希神廟（Preah Vihear）的判決。此案30日將在荷蘭海牙開庭，泰國外交部長卡席特（Kasit Piromya）將率領法律團隊前往捍衛立場。 泰柬今年兩度在邊界發生交火衝突，柬埔寨向國際法庭上訴，要求法庭解釋當年把神廟判給柬埔寨的判決，並解釋當時沒有進一步說明的周圍爭議地區。 普里維希神廟周圍4.6公里土地歸屬問題，一直爭議不斷，泰柬都宣稱擁有該爭議土地，並且多次兵戎相向。 柬埔寨除了要求法庭重新解釋外，也請求法庭發布臨時命令，要求泰國立即從爭議地區撤兵，並禁止泰國軍隊靠近神廟，且要求泰國停止各項影響柬埔寨權益、或讓爭議複雜化的各項活動。 泰國外交部發言人塔尼（Thani Thongphakdi）今天表示，卡席特30日、31日將出席法院聽證會，泰方預期法庭會在1到3星期內針對柬埔寨臨時命令的訴求，做出裁決。 另外，泰國看守總理艾比希（Abhisit Vejjajiva）指出，柬埔寨要求管理神廟周圍地區的計畫，聯合國教育、科學、文化組織（UNESCO）可能會延後審議。 艾比希也表示，泰柬邊界委員會預計近期內在柬埔寨開會，兩國將透過雙邊機制，針對爭議領土與交火衝突等問題，展開會談。 【2011/05/27 中央社】  |
2011年5月28日 星期六
國際法庭重釋神廟判決 泰捍衛
2011年5月18日 星期三
2011年2月27日 星期日
UN罕見！格達費移送ICC
西方國家的制裁提案包括武器禁運，並針對格達費、格達費家屬及親信實施凍結資產及限制出境等措施。但提案中關於利比亞血腥鎮壓事件是否違反人道法，以及是否送交國際刑事法庭（ICC）調查，因爭議頗高，必須動用表決。
但是聯合國秘書長潘基文（Ban Ki-moon）對安理會15個會員國施壓，強調若不及時採取「具體行動」，將會傷及更多人命。
利比亞駐聯合國大使沙格翰（AbdurrahmanShalgam）則寫了一封懇切的陳情信，希望安理會採取行動，制止格達費的「暴行」。沙格翰是格達費童年摯友，曾任利比亞外交部長。
沙格翰今天在信中，強烈支持安理會決議文草案，也支持將鎮壓百姓一案送交ICC調查。外交官員原先以為，格達費送交ICC審議的決議，要等到下週才舉行。
匿名安理會外交官表示：「我們有多層面的顧慮，但是ICC是最大癥結。」
法國和英國是決議文草案的主導國，法國駐聯合國大使阿勞德（Gerard Araud）說：「在武器禁運和制裁方面，各國意見相同，檯面上唯一分歧議題是把格達費送交ICC審理。」
英國駐聯合國大使葛蘭特（Mark Lyall Grant）也說，利比亞鎮壓是否觸犯人道罪，引發多項爭論。
制裁決議文若被視為不正當干預一國內政，或恐對未來國際行動設下先例，向來不為中國及俄羅斯所接受。
安理會主要會員國當中，美國、中國、俄羅斯和印度都不是ICC會員國，且對ICC抱持懷疑態度。
達佛（Darfur）大屠殺案是安理會唯一送交ICC審理的爭議。蘇丹總統巴席爾（Omar al-Bashir）後來以戰爭罪和種族屠殺罪遭起訴。
然而，格達費死忠分子在的黎波里（Tripoli）對示威人士開槍的報導，再加上25日安理會上的幾個慷慨陳詞，讓安理會最後不得不努力通過決議文。
聯合國秘書長潘基文表示，利比亞血腥鎮壓已造成逾千人死亡。利比亞駐聯合國公使先前說，數千人已經喪命。
潘基文表示，利比亞武裝部隊到各個醫院殺害受傷的異議人士，拒絕開槍的士兵則會遭到格殺。
他說：「該是安理會考慮採取具體行動的時候了。」
隨後利比亞駐聯合國大使沙格翰也把格達費形容成德國的希特勒（Adolf Hitler）、柬埔寨的波布（PolPot）和蘇聯的史達林（Joseph Stalin），並籲請安理會採取行動制止格達費的「暴行」。
沙格翰說，格達費現在對人民的態度是，「你若不讓我統治，我就殺了你、毀了你」。
他懇切地告訴安理會成員：「求求你，聯合國，救救利比亞。讓那裡不再血流成河，不要再濫殺無辜。」他說：「我們需要你們做出果斷、快速和勇敢的決議。」
安理會今天於罕見地在週末晚間召開緊急會議，15個安理會會員國無異議通過決議案，制裁格達費及其家屬親信。（譯者：中央社賴秀如）1
2011年2月25日 星期五
Lessons Learned from the Philippines Extradition Row
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17&id=20110208000086
這是有關領域管轄和引渡問題的傳統國際法議題，許老師本週六在台大校總區的霖澤館（法學院）有一場座談，同學可以去聽聽看喲！
The jurisdiction dispute that arose after the Philippines deported 14 Taiwanese nationals suspected of fraud to China for crimes against Chinese nationals indicates Taiwan's challenges in maintaining ties with Southeast Asian countries, despite improved cross-strait relations.
Taiwan's relations, especially in trade with Southeast Asia, regressed after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2000 due to increased tensions with China.
As Taiwan's relations with China have a great influence on the island's trade with Southeast Asia, which improved after the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement was signed in 2010, Taiwan cannot afford to see relations worsen as its economic strength could again be undermined.
Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should be held responsible for its slow reaction to the current dispute since it did not have first-hand information about the arrests involving the Taiwanese nationals last December.
While Taiwan has to protest against the Philippines bowing down to China's demands to hand over the Taiwanese suspects, the MOFA should work on building closer ties with Southeastern Asian countries, particularly in trade, education and culture, even though Taiwan and China have ceased the fight for diplomatic allies.
Chinese pressure to extradite the Taiwanese suspects is understandable, since Taiwan had ruled in a similar previous case that the defendants were innocent, which meant the Chinese victims are unable to seek compensation. Fraud is a felony that carries a sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment in China, while the maximum jail term for the same crime is five years in Taiwan.
However, since Taiwan and China have different human rights standards, the location of the trial has a significant impact on the rights of the accused Taiwanese nationals.
Taiwan should make it clear to China that the island is toughening its stand against crime with heavier sentences in order to prevent similar disputes in the future, especially since both sides signed a judicial cooperation agreement in 2009.
Taiwan should also be credited for its restrained official reaction to the matter, focusing only on the return of the Taiwanese suspects. It would increase trust between the two sides if China hands back the Taiwanese nationals to stand trial in Taiwan after it completes its own investigation.
(issued by TA wei-en)
這是有關領域管轄和引渡問題的傳統國際法議題，許老師本週六在台大校總區的霖澤館（法學院）有一場座談，同學可以去聽聽看喲！
The jurisdiction dispute that arose after the Philippines deported 14 Taiwanese nationals suspected of fraud to China for crimes against Chinese nationals indicates Taiwan's challenges in maintaining ties with Southeast Asian countries, despite improved cross-strait relations.
Taiwan's relations, especially in trade with Southeast Asia, regressed after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2000 due to increased tensions with China.
As Taiwan's relations with China have a great influence on the island's trade with Southeast Asia, which improved after the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement was signed in 2010, Taiwan cannot afford to see relations worsen as its economic strength could again be undermined.
Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should be held responsible for its slow reaction to the current dispute since it did not have first-hand information about the arrests involving the Taiwanese nationals last December.
While Taiwan has to protest against the Philippines bowing down to China's demands to hand over the Taiwanese suspects, the MOFA should work on building closer ties with Southeastern Asian countries, particularly in trade, education and culture, even though Taiwan and China have ceased the fight for diplomatic allies.
Chinese pressure to extradite the Taiwanese suspects is understandable, since Taiwan had ruled in a similar previous case that the defendants were innocent, which meant the Chinese victims are unable to seek compensation. Fraud is a felony that carries a sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment in China, while the maximum jail term for the same crime is five years in Taiwan.
However, since Taiwan and China have different human rights standards, the location of the trial has a significant impact on the rights of the accused Taiwanese nationals.
Taiwan should make it clear to China that the island is toughening its stand against crime with heavier sentences in order to prevent similar disputes in the future, especially since both sides signed a judicial cooperation agreement in 2009.
Taiwan should also be credited for its restrained official reaction to the matter, focusing only on the return of the Taiwanese suspects. It would increase trust between the two sides if China hands back the Taiwanese nationals to stand trial in Taiwan after it completes its own investigation.
(issued by TA wei-en)
Warning: old stone temples can start wars
甫里維哈寺位於泰國與柬埔寨之間邊界山脈中一塊高地（Dangrek）上，根據1904年暹羅（泰國舊稱）和法國（當時柬埔寨是法國的保護地）之間的一項條約規定，雙方同意有關此山脈邊界線之劃定，應沿著分水嶺線為之。兩國為此另設立了一個混合委員會，礙於技術因素，當時泰國政府委託由法國調查隊來負責繪製該地區地圖的工作。1908年地圖繪製完成，當時泰國政府收到此地圖時即已發現古寺被標註在柬埔寨的領域內（即山脈分水嶺的另一邊），但卻未表明任何異議（直到1935年）。1953年柬埔寨獨立之後，新政府試圖在該地區確立其領土主權，但因泰國派駐軍隊於古寺，效果有限。1959年10月，柬埔寨向國際法院提起訴訟，請求法院宣告古寺的領土主權屬於柬埔寨，泰國應將其駐紮於古寺的武裝部隊撤離。法院先於1961年確立對本案的管轄權，接著在1962年對本案進行實質審理與裁決，判定古寺是屬於柬埔寨。(issued by TA wei-en)
Thai-Cambodian conflictFeb 10th 2011
KANTHARALAK
SITTING on her straw mat, Pisamai Poonsuk recalls how her family of ten fled their border village in a pickup truck soon after the shells began falling. After staying the night with relatives, the family moved into a temporary camp. Ms Pisamai, a cassava farmer, is waiting for the all-clear to go home. She prays the ceasefire will hold between the Thai and Cambodian soldiers ranged along a disputed border. She has little time for Thai jingoism. “We should trade with the Cambodians. We should be brothers.”
Fat chance. The clashes that erupted on February 4th were the fiercest since July 2008, when the two armies first began rumbling at each other in the vicinity of Preah Vihear, an 11th-century Khmer temple that Cambodia wants to develop for mass tourism. Six people died and dozens more were injured during four days of fighting. The temple itself was only slightly damaged. Each side accuses the other of firing first into populated areas.
Though the shelling has stopped, any ceasefire remains fragile as long as nationalists in both countries keep stoking the dispute. Thailand’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, faces street protests by the ultra-conservative People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) over his alleged failure to defend Thai soil. Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, does not tolerate protests but is sensitive to claims of lost sovereignty. He quickly castigated war-mongering Thailand and called for UN peacekeepers on the border.
It is not the first time that an ancient temple has bred violence. In 2003 anti-Thai riots erupted in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was misquoted as saying that Angkor Wat, which appears on the Cambodian flag, belonged to Thailand. On February 8th PAD leaders said that Thai troops should threaten to invade, forcing a return of Preah Vihear. To Cambodians, resentful of being pushed around by big neighbours, this is bully-boy stuff.
In 1962 the World Court ruled that Preah Vihear, which sits on a ridge, was on Cambodian soil. But it did not rule on overlapping claims to the temple’s hinterland. In 2008 UNESCO listed the temple as a World Heritage site, to the delight of Cambodia’s tourist industry. The PAD cried foul over what it claimed was a loss of Thai territory. The controversy became a pretext for marathon protests that helped topple an elected government and sweep Mr Abhisit into power. Now the PAD vows to topple its erstwhile ally.
Despite international concern, Mr Hun Sen’s plea for UN intervention seems a non-starter. Thailand insists that bilateral talks can resolve the border dispute and rejects outside mediation. This did not stop Indonesia from dipping a toe into the row. It currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which the two feuding parties belong (see Banyan). Its foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, flew to both capitals this week for talks. But, an ASEAN diplomat sniffs, Indonesia should keep its own ambitions in check, lest the tables are turned in future. Nobody wants anyone “meddling in his own affairs”, he says. So much for Ms Pisamai’s brotherhood.
Thai-Cambodian conflictFeb 10th 2011
KANTHARALAK
SITTING on her straw mat, Pisamai Poonsuk recalls how her family of ten fled their border village in a pickup truck soon after the shells began falling. After staying the night with relatives, the family moved into a temporary camp. Ms Pisamai, a cassava farmer, is waiting for the all-clear to go home. She prays the ceasefire will hold between the Thai and Cambodian soldiers ranged along a disputed border. She has little time for Thai jingoism. “We should trade with the Cambodians. We should be brothers.”
Fat chance. The clashes that erupted on February 4th were the fiercest since July 2008, when the two armies first began rumbling at each other in the vicinity of Preah Vihear, an 11th-century Khmer temple that Cambodia wants to develop for mass tourism. Six people died and dozens more were injured during four days of fighting. The temple itself was only slightly damaged. Each side accuses the other of firing first into populated areas.
Though the shelling has stopped, any ceasefire remains fragile as long as nationalists in both countries keep stoking the dispute. Thailand’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, faces street protests by the ultra-conservative People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) over his alleged failure to defend Thai soil. Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, does not tolerate protests but is sensitive to claims of lost sovereignty. He quickly castigated war-mongering Thailand and called for UN peacekeepers on the border.
It is not the first time that an ancient temple has bred violence. In 2003 anti-Thai riots erupted in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was misquoted as saying that Angkor Wat, which appears on the Cambodian flag, belonged to Thailand. On February 8th PAD leaders said that Thai troops should threaten to invade, forcing a return of Preah Vihear. To Cambodians, resentful of being pushed around by big neighbours, this is bully-boy stuff.
In 1962 the World Court ruled that Preah Vihear, which sits on a ridge, was on Cambodian soil. But it did not rule on overlapping claims to the temple’s hinterland. In 2008 UNESCO listed the temple as a World Heritage site, to the delight of Cambodia’s tourist industry. The PAD cried foul over what it claimed was a loss of Thai territory. The controversy became a pretext for marathon protests that helped topple an elected government and sweep Mr Abhisit into power. Now the PAD vows to topple its erstwhile ally.
Despite international concern, Mr Hun Sen’s plea for UN intervention seems a non-starter. Thailand insists that bilateral talks can resolve the border dispute and rejects outside mediation. This did not stop Indonesia from dipping a toe into the row. It currently holds the rotating chair of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which the two feuding parties belong (see Banyan). Its foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, flew to both capitals this week for talks. But, an ASEAN diplomat sniffs, Indonesia should keep its own ambitions in check, lest the tables are turned in future. Nobody wants anyone “meddling in his own affairs”, he says. So much for Ms Pisamai’s brotherhood.
A sea of disputes
這是有關國家間爭端領土的問題，剛好與老師下週開始要談的國家領域有關。台灣也是這起爭端中的一造，值得大家關注。(issued by TA wei-en)
Feb 21st 2011, 8:44 by Banyan
TWO truths about the disputes in the South China Sea are well-recognised: they are extremely complex, and much misunderstood. An illuminating day-long conference at the Institute of South-East Asian Studies in Singapore on February 18th brought home a third. There is no realistic prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped is to manage the disputes without any resort to armed conflict.
Part of the difficulty is that the dispute has so many aspects—or rather there are so many separate disputes. The territorial issue that receives so much attention is itself a plethora of different and overlapping claims. China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel island chain, from which China evicted Vietnam in 1974, in the dying days of the Vietnam war. Taiwan—because it is the “Republic of China”—mirrors China’s claim, so that huge unresolved dispute also has a bearing on this one. The same three parties also claim the Spratly archipelago, to the south. But in the south, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also have partial claims.
Some of these arguments might in theory be soluble under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established in 1982. Some of the parties have tried to align their claim with UNCLOS. In 2009, for example, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission, showing where they thought their claims lay, based on their continental shelves. This implied that the Spratlys—a collection of reefs, rocks and tiny islands—were all too small to support human habitation and hence have their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under UNCLOS.
China, however, objected to that submission and tabled its own map, with nine dotted lines outlining its claim. Joined up, the dotted lines give it not just the two chains, but almost the whole sea. There seems to be no basis for this in UNCLOS. But China points to history. It says the map has been in use since the Republic of China published it in 1946, and, until quite recently, nobody minded. Indonesia, in turn, subsequently objected to China’s objection, which gave China a claim over some Indonesian waters, too. According to American officials, China has upped the ante by talking of its territorial claims in the South China Sea as a “core” national interest, on a par with Tibet and Taiwan.
There is a huge amount at stake. Besides fisheries, the sea, particularly around the Spratlys, is believed to be enormously rich in hydrocarbons. The lure of such riches ought to make it attractive to devise joint-development mechanisms so that all could benefit. In practice, the resources potentially available make it even harder for any country to moderate its claim.
The sea is also a vital shipping route, accounting for a big chunk of world trade. It is the importance of the freedom of navigation and of overflight that has given America its pretext for louder involvement. This was initially welcomed by the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations when voiced at a regional forum in Hanoi in July last year, So fiercely did China object to America’s rather disingenuous offer of “mediation”, however, that some countries may now be ruing it.
So a second related dispute is between two regional superpowers: China and America. In particular, America and China differ over whether military activities are permissible in another country's EEZ. America insists they are. China objects to them and has on occasion harassed America’s spy planes and survey ships.
A third dispute is between China and ASEAN. These two reached a common “Declaration on Conduct” (DoC) in 2002 in an attempt to minimise the risk of conflict. But efforts to turn it into a formal and binding code have got nowhere, partly because of China’s anger at ASEAN’s attempts to develop a common approach.
China argues that ASEAN has no role in territorial issues, and insists on negotiating with the other claimants bilaterally. ASEAN sees this as an effort to pick off its members one by one. It argues that its own charter forces members to consult, as they do before each working group on the code of conduct (the next one is due in March).
Optimists point out that, distant though any settlement seems to be, at least the DoC has helped keep tensions down. Indeed, since 1988, when China and Vietnam clashed near the Spratlys, there have been no serious armed flare-ups. Tension rose in 1995, when China was found to have built on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines. Fishermen are sometimes locked up for encroaching in another country’s claim. But the risk of escalation into conflict has seemed limited.
It is even possible to claim that the “self-restraint” the DoC calls for is being observed, since no new uninhabited islands or rocks have been occupied. However, that may be because none of those that is left is remotely big enough, and on those that were already occupied, building has continued, in some cases as if the claimants hope to turn rocks, or even “low-tide elevations”, into real islands—a practice not recognised under UNCLOS.
In their complexity, the South China Sea disputes provide material for endless scholarly bickering. Now that America has made it a focus for its re-engagement in Asia’s seas as a superpower and guarantor of the peace, and China has made clear it resents this, they also present some serious risks.
Feb 21st 2011, 8:44 by Banyan
TWO truths about the disputes in the South China Sea are well-recognised: they are extremely complex, and much misunderstood. An illuminating day-long conference at the Institute of South-East Asian Studies in Singapore on February 18th brought home a third. There is no realistic prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped is to manage the disputes without any resort to armed conflict.
Part of the difficulty is that the dispute has so many aspects—or rather there are so many separate disputes. The territorial issue that receives so much attention is itself a plethora of different and overlapping claims. China and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel island chain, from which China evicted Vietnam in 1974, in the dying days of the Vietnam war. Taiwan—because it is the “Republic of China”—mirrors China’s claim, so that huge unresolved dispute also has a bearing on this one. The same three parties also claim the Spratly archipelago, to the south. But in the south, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also have partial claims.
Some of these arguments might in theory be soluble under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established in 1982. Some of the parties have tried to align their claim with UNCLOS. In 2009, for example, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission, showing where they thought their claims lay, based on their continental shelves. This implied that the Spratlys—a collection of reefs, rocks and tiny islands—were all too small to support human habitation and hence have their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under UNCLOS.
China, however, objected to that submission and tabled its own map, with nine dotted lines outlining its claim. Joined up, the dotted lines give it not just the two chains, but almost the whole sea. There seems to be no basis for this in UNCLOS. But China points to history. It says the map has been in use since the Republic of China published it in 1946, and, until quite recently, nobody minded. Indonesia, in turn, subsequently objected to China’s objection, which gave China a claim over some Indonesian waters, too. According to American officials, China has upped the ante by talking of its territorial claims in the South China Sea as a “core” national interest, on a par with Tibet and Taiwan.
There is a huge amount at stake. Besides fisheries, the sea, particularly around the Spratlys, is believed to be enormously rich in hydrocarbons. The lure of such riches ought to make it attractive to devise joint-development mechanisms so that all could benefit. In practice, the resources potentially available make it even harder for any country to moderate its claim.
The sea is also a vital shipping route, accounting for a big chunk of world trade. It is the importance of the freedom of navigation and of overflight that has given America its pretext for louder involvement. This was initially welcomed by the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations when voiced at a regional forum in Hanoi in July last year, So fiercely did China object to America’s rather disingenuous offer of “mediation”, however, that some countries may now be ruing it.
So a second related dispute is between two regional superpowers: China and America. In particular, America and China differ over whether military activities are permissible in another country's EEZ. America insists they are. China objects to them and has on occasion harassed America’s spy planes and survey ships.
A third dispute is between China and ASEAN. These two reached a common “Declaration on Conduct” (DoC) in 2002 in an attempt to minimise the risk of conflict. But efforts to turn it into a formal and binding code have got nowhere, partly because of China’s anger at ASEAN’s attempts to develop a common approach.
China argues that ASEAN has no role in territorial issues, and insists on negotiating with the other claimants bilaterally. ASEAN sees this as an effort to pick off its members one by one. It argues that its own charter forces members to consult, as they do before each working group on the code of conduct (the next one is due in March).
Optimists point out that, distant though any settlement seems to be, at least the DoC has helped keep tensions down. Indeed, since 1988, when China and Vietnam clashed near the Spratlys, there have been no serious armed flare-ups. Tension rose in 1995, when China was found to have built on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines. Fishermen are sometimes locked up for encroaching in another country’s claim. But the risk of escalation into conflict has seemed limited.
It is even possible to claim that the “self-restraint” the DoC calls for is being observed, since no new uninhabited islands or rocks have been occupied. However, that may be because none of those that is left is remotely big enough, and on those that were already occupied, building has continued, in some cases as if the claimants hope to turn rocks, or even “low-tide elevations”, into real islands—a practice not recognised under UNCLOS.
In their complexity, the South China Sea disputes provide material for endless scholarly bickering. Now that America has made it a focus for its re-engagement in Asia’s seas as a superpower and guarantor of the peace, and China has made clear it resents this, they also present some serious risks.
2010年12月14日 星期二
國際刑事法院相關案件時事
Posted 22 hours ago Sunday, December 12th, 2010 at 11:55 am UTC
The Zambian government has announced it will not arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir if he attends a regional summit there next week.
A government spokesman says Zambia will abide by the African Union's decision to ignore an International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Mr. Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The AU says the Sudanese president has not been convicted of any crimes and therefore should not be detained.
Zambia is a member state of the International Criminal Court and under its rules is obliged to arrest Mr. Bashir if he is in the country.
Mr. Bashir has not said publicly if he will attend next week's summit.
The Sudanese leader has already traveled to other ICC member states including Chad and Uganda and was not arrested
But, Mr. Bashir's expected presence at a meeting in Kenya recently attracted so much controversy the event was moved to Ethiopia.
(本篇由勇銘助教代偉恩助教張貼)
The Zambian government has announced it will not arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir if he attends a regional summit there next week.
A government spokesman says Zambia will abide by the African Union's decision to ignore an International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Mr. Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The AU says the Sudanese president has not been convicted of any crimes and therefore should not be detained.
Zambia is a member state of the International Criminal Court and under its rules is obliged to arrest Mr. Bashir if he is in the country.
Mr. Bashir has not said publicly if he will attend next week's summit.
The Sudanese leader has already traveled to other ICC member states including Chad and Uganda and was not arrested
But, Mr. Bashir's expected presence at a meeting in Kenya recently attracted so much controversy the event was moved to Ethiopia.
(本篇由勇銘助教代偉恩助教張貼)
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